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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following situations. First, police arrest a suspect in a
robbery, take him to the station, and leave him in a room. After a while, an
officer enters the room and says, “I’m going to ask you a few questions
about the robbery. We know you did it, but I want you to tell me what
happened in your own words.” The suspect answers the questions and
makes incriminating statements. No one ever says anything to the suspect
*
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about any rights he might have with respect to interrogation. The
government seeks to use those statements at trial.
Second, investigators seek to question a government employee
during an administrative audit of the use of government credit cards. The
employee says she does not want to respond for fear she might incriminate
herself. Her supervisor tells her she must answer the questions or lose her
job. Sheresponds and the government later seeks to prosecute her based on
her incriminating statements.
Third, law enforcement officials arrest a person suspected of taking
part in a terrorist attack. He refuses to provide any information. Partly to
obtain a confession and partly to learn if future attacks are imminent,
officials engage in a variety of coercive interrogation tactics, such as
hooding, sleep deprivation, prolonged uncomfortable positions, drastic
temperature changes, slapping, and shaking.1 Broken, the suspect provides
incriminating and useful information.
The first situation is a straightforward Miranda problem. The
suspect never received the Miranda warnings, and none of the exceptions
apply, with the result thatany incriminating statements made during that
interrogation must be excluded.2 The second situation also seems
straightforward. The witness will receive use and derivative-use immunity
for any incriminating statements that she made in response to her
supervisor’s threats. 3 The only difference between the two situations is that
Miranda’s application to otherwise uncompelled testimony has been
described as a possibly non-constitutional prophylactic rule, whereas the
remedy of immunity for compelled incrimination in civil cases – whether or
not the wit ness is a government employee responding to threats – has been
described as a constitutional right.4 Even that difference might seem minor
after the Court held in Dickerson v. United States that “Miranda is a
constitutional decision.”5 The third situation is easiest of all. The
1

U.S., Israeli, and British forces have used similar tactics to interrogate suspected
terrorists. See John T. Parry, What is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What if We Are?, 64
U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 241-42, 250 (2003).
2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For the exceptions to Miranda, see
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 519-26 (3d ed. 2000).
3
See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
4
For statements that Miranda is prophylactic in a non-constitutional sense, see Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). For statements that a constitutional right to
receive immunity in response to compelled incrimination applies in civil cases, see
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983); Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975);
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 440.
5
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interrogation violates the privilege against self-incrimination, any
statements were involuntary as a matter of due process, and the suspect may
bring a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens.6
Yet the three cases are harder than they first appear. What if the
government never seeks to use the statements against any of the suspects –
has there been any violation of a constitutional right, or is the government
free to compel incriminating statements so long as they are not used at trial?
At least with respect to the third case, the damages claim remains regardless
of what happens at trial – yet what is the source of the claim? If the claim
asserts a violation of the privilege, then surely the suspects in the other
cases could also state a claim for damages. If the claim asserts a violation
of due process, what exactly is the scope of the right, and does it extend to
the other cases as well? Given the context of the case and the government’s
strong interest in obtaining information, does the suspect in the third case
have a good constitutional claim on the merits? Finally, if these suspects
never made incriminating statements, could they still seek damages for their
interrogators’ unconstitutional conduct?
Last Term, in Chavez v. Martinez,7 the Supreme Court addressed
most of these issues. In six opinions, the Court wrestled with the scope of
the privilege, the status of Miranda, and the proper method of defining
substantive due process rights. A majority of the Court ruled that violations
of Miranda will never support a claim for damages and violations of the
privilege against self-incrimination will almost never support a damages
claim. Four justices would have gone further, moreover, to hold that
damages are never available for violations of thepriv ilege and that large
parts of self-incrimination doctrine are merely non-constitutional
prophylactic rules. Little was said about the possibility of damages for
violations of the due process constraint on involuntary confessions. The
Court’sdecision mea ns, in short, thatcivil rights actions over coercive
interrogation practices will now fall largely within the domain of
substantive due process, most likely under the notoriously vague “shocks
6

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing damages
action against federal agents directly under the Constitution); see Wiggins v. Martin, 150
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Chicago police); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1997) (same). For
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law enforcement in the United States, see Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2011-12
(2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); John T. Parry, Judicial
Restraints on Illegal State Violence: Israel and the United States, 35 VAND. J. TRANS. L.
73, 98 n.120 (2002) [hereinafter Parry, Judicial Restraints]; Welsh S. White, Defending
Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13 & n.73 (1986).
7
123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).
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the conscience” test. And, critically, at least three justices were prepared to
hold in Chavez that no substantive due process right to be free of coercive
interrogations exists if government interests in obtaining information are
sufficiently strong.
This article takes Chavez as the point of departure for considering a
series of issues relating to constitutional interpretation, criminal procedure,
and civil rights litigation. Tempting though it may beto dismiss Chavez
because the Court was so fractured, the divisions on the Court are precisely
what makes the case significant because they reveal the fault lines that run
through much of our constitutional jurisprudence. Part II describes the facts
and proceedings in Chavez, highlights the central features of the various
opinions, and begins the task of analyzing the implications of Chavez for
self-incrimination, due process, and civil rights litigation. Part III assesses
Chavez’s impact on the privilege against self-incrimination, including the
Miranda doctrine but also – and more significantly – the doctrine of
requiring immunity as a remedy for violations of the privilege. I explain
how the plurality opinion undermines core aspects of self-incrimination
doctrine.
Because the plurality opinion described much of privilege doctrine
as prophylactic, moreover, Part IV addresses the ongoing debate over the
legitimacy of prophylactic rules in criminal procedure and constitutional
law. Chavez may be more important on this issue than Dickerson and it is
at least the necessary pendent to Dickerson – together, the cases reveal a
majority of the Court’s intention to preserve Miranda while carefully
limiting its scope and effectiveness.8 Chavez is critical to this effort
because it highlights a pervasive flaw in constitutional interpretation:
although remedies are fundamental to the definition of constitutional rights,
the Court rarely acts as if remedies were a meaningful part of constitutional
doctrine. Until it extricates itself from the debate over prophylactic rules,
the Court will not be able to take remedies seriously as an aspect of
constitutional law. Indeed, after Chavez, we should seriously consider
jettisoning the idea of prophylactic rules entirely.
Part V returns to the issue of coercive interrogation. I first provide
an account of the privilege against self-incrimination that is true to the
remedies available for its violation, and I pay particular attention to the
context of civil rights claims for damages. Text, history, and policy
8

The Court has a chance to refine this position in two pending cases. See United States v.
Patane, U.S., No. 02-1183 (reconsidering fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine’s applicability
to Miranda): Missouri v. Seibert, U.S. No. 02-1371 (considering validity of intentional
interrogation without warnings followed by warnings and a second round of interrogation).
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support, on balance, a broad privilege, including Miranda – but without a
damages remedy the right remains weak. Drawing on Justice Harlan’s
admonishment that self-incrimination issues reflect broader issues of constitutional policy, I turn to the role of due process doctrines within the
constitutional protection against coercive interrogation. Violations of the
due process voluntariness test will not support a damages claim under
current doctrine, and substantive due process is inadequate on its own. In
the process, I also consider what Chavez tells us about the Court’s
substantive due process jurisprudence more generally – in brief, that the
Court remains sharply divided over the definition of substantive due process
rights, and rights claims may have to yield to law enforcement needs,
perhaps especially in the context of fighting terrorism. Indeed, under the
plurality’s analysis, the Constitution permits torture. Finally, with these
concerns in mind, I propose a broad damages remedy for violations of the
privilege and the due process voluntariness test.
II. CHAVEZ V. MARTINEZ
On the evening of November 28, 1997, Olivero Martinez, a farm
worker, rode his bicycle home along a dark path through a vacant lot in
Oxnard, California. Nearby, police officers Maria Peña and Andrew
Salinas were investigating suspected drug activity. While they were
questioning another person, they heard Martinez's bicycle. Peña and
Salinas ordered Martinez to stop, dismount, and place his hands behind his
head while they frisked him.
Salinas found a knife in Martinez's waistband, which Martinez later
claimed he used for work. Salinas apparently suspected the knife had a
different purpose. On the crucial issue of what happened next, accounts
diverge. According to Peña and Salinas, Martinez pulled away as Salinas
sought to handcuff him. As Salinas tried to subdue Martinez, they began to
struggle. Somehow, Martinez pulled Salinas's gun and pointed it at the
officers. Martinez, by contrast, charged that Salinas tackled him without
warning after finding the knife and then drew his gun as they struggled.
Martinez grabbed Salinas's hand to prevent him from using the gun.
Under both versions, Salinas next yelled, “He's got my gun.” Peña
responded by drawing her own gun and shooting Martinez several times in
the head, chest, and legs, leaving him blind and paralyzed from the waist
down. The officers then handcuffed Martinez and placed him under arrest.
Soon thereafter, police officer Ben Chavez arrived at the scene with
paramedics. After discussing the events with Peña and Salinas, Chavez
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rode in the ambulance when Martinez was taken to the hospital.9
At the hospital, Chavez spent forty-five minutes attempting to obtain
a statement from Martinez at the same time that hospital personnel were
attempting to treat him. Seeking a statement from a person who was
involved in an altercation with police officers was plainly a legitimate
investigative goal. But Martinez was also a suspect in potential criminal
activity arising from the altercation, yet Chavez never gave him the
warnings required by Miranda. Moreover, the transcript of the
interrogation makes clear that Martinez was not always coherent, was in
great pain, and believed he might be dying.10 Chavez stopped the
interrogation twice, apparently to allow treatment, but he also responded to
many of Martinez's cries of pain with the demand that Martinez tell him
what had happened and repeatedly told Martinez that he ought to talk if he
thought he was dying.11
Martinezcould not say when he was born, did not respond to
questions asking him his name, and at first said that he did not know what
had happened.12 Chavez used leading questions to get more information,
and Martinez admitted fighting with the police, although he was unable to
say why.13 At one point Martinez agreed that he had grabbed Salinas's gun,
and at another point he said he pulled the gun from its holster.14 He
insisted, however, that he simply wanted Salinas to stop, and he denied any
intention to shoot the gun.15 Martinez also admitted drinking alcohol and
using heroin that day. In light of his condition at the hospital and the nature
of the interview, little that Martinezsaid – whether exculpatory or
9

I have drawn this account from Justice Thomas's opinion,see Chavez, 123 S.Ct. at 1999,
and the Ninth Circuit's opinion, see Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir.
2001), as well as from the parties' briefs, see Brief for the Petitioner at 2-3 and Brief for the
Respondent at 1-2, Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003) (No. 01-1444). The parties
also disagreed about when Salinas found Martinez’s knife, but the Ninth Circuit and
Supreme Court assumed Salinas found the knife during the patdown.
10
See Statement of Olivero Martinez, in Joint Appendix, Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct.
1994 (2003) (No. 01-1444). Chavez and Martinez spoke in Spanish but the transcript
includes an English translation.
11
See id. at 9-11, 13-15, 18-20.
12
See id. at 7-10.
13
See id. at 11.
14
See id. at 11, 15-16.
15
See id. at 12, 17. When first asked why he grabbed the gun, Martinez responded, “Yo
quería tirar.” Id. at 12. According to the translator, “The word ‘tirar’ has three different
meanings: to shoot, to throw away, [or] to drop. Because of the ungrammatical structure of
this sentence, the phrase is subject to more than [one] interpretation.” Id. at 23. In the
context of the entire transcript, I do not believe Martinez was admitting that he wanted to
shoot the gun (although, of course, that could have been his actual intention).
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inculpatory – can be deemed clearly reliable.
Martinez never faced any charges arising out of these events.
Instead, he sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California, claiming that Peña and Salinas had
stopped him without probable cause and used excessive force against him in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and that Chavez had subjected him to a
coercive interrogation in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.16
The District Court rejected Chavez's assertion of qualified immunity
and granted summary judgment to Martinez on his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment inter rogation claims.17 The court compared the case to Mincey
v. Arizona, a due process involuntary confession case in which the Supreme
Court ruled that the results of a hospital interrogation of a suspect in
extreme pain were inadmissible, and it found that “under the totality of the
circumstances [Martinez's] statement was not voluntarily given.”18 In its
analysis of qualified immunity, the court concluded that “no reasonable
officer would believe that an interview of an individual receiving treatment
for life-threatening injuries that resulted in blindness, paralysis, and
excruciating pain was constitutionally permissible.”19
Chavez appealed the denial of qualified immunity.20 The Ninth
Circuitagreed that Chavez's questioning had been unconstitutionally
coercive but also considered an issue that the district court had not
addressed – whether a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination
could occur if the state never sought to use the statements. Relying on its
16

See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2000; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 3. Martinez also
sued the City of Oxnard and two other individuals but dismissed those claims during the
district court litigation. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Adjudication, Martinez v. City of Oxnard, CV 98-9313 FMC (AJWx) (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Order], in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16a, Chavez v.
Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003) (No. 01-14
44). Because Martinez sued state officials, all
of his claims actually arose under the Fourteenth Amendment, which incorporates the
Fourth, Eighth, and most of the Fifth Amendments against the states. See Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Self-Incrimination Clause); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth
Amendment); see also Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2008-09 (Scalia, J., concurring in part in the
judgment).
17
See Order, supra note 16, at 30a. The court denied summary judgment to Martinez on
his other claims. See id.
18
Id. at 22a-23a (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)).
19
Id. at 29a.
20
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (allowing interlocutory review of denials of
qualified immunity).

Constitutional Interpretation and Coercive Interrogation

8

en banc opinion in Cooper v. Dupnik,21 the court held that coercive
interrogation violates the privilege if the subject of the interrogation “could
reasonably believe [that the statement] might be used in a criminal
prosecution or lead to evidence that might be so used.”22 The court
recognized that the Supreme Court described the privilege against selfincrimination in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez as “a fundamental trial
right of criminal defendants,” with the result that, “[a]lthough conduct by
law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a
constitutional violation occurs only at trial.”23 The Ninth Circuit, however,
characterized this statement as dicta and declared itself bound by Cooper.24
The court then considered whether Chavez's conduct also “violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.”25 Again relying on Cooper, the court stated
simply that coercive interrogation violates the Fourteenth Amendment
whether or not the resulting statement is ever used in a criminal
proceeding.26 Finally, relying, as had the district court, on Mincey v.
Arizona, the court held that Martinez's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were clearly established at the time Chavez acted.27
In a confusing welter of opinions, the Supreme Court reversed the
denial of qualified immunity and remanded for further proceedings. Justice
Thomas wrote the lead opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquistjoined i n full
and which Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined for most relevant portions.
Justice Thomas first endorsed the Supreme Court’s current approach to
issues of qualified immunity: “we must first determine whether the
officer‘s alleged conduct violated a constitutional right [before]
consider[ing] whether the asserted right was ‘clearly established.’”28
21

963 F.2d 1220, 1238-44 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
23
494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).
24
Martinez, 270 F.3d at 857 & n.3.
25
Id. at 857; see Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2008-09 (Scalia, J., concurring in part in the
judgment) (arguing this language must be a reference to substantive due process).
26
See Martinez, 270 F.3d at 857; Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1244-48.
27
See Martinez, 270 F.3d at 858-59.
28
Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2000 (plurality opinion) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001)); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998); Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991). Justice Thomas’s actual language – “we must first
determine whether the officer‘s alleged conduct violated a constitutional right. If not, the
officer is entitled to qualified immunity, and we need not consider whether the asserted
right was ‘clearly established’” – oddly suggests that defendants should receive immunity
rather than dismissal on the merits of the claim if no federal rights were violated. For
discussions of the Court’s qualified immunity methodologies, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. &
Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV.
22
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Justice Thomas began his examination of Martinez’s rights with the
self-incrimination claim. He stressed thatthe text of the Fifth Amendment
states, “’No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself,’” and endorsed the Court's statement in VerdugoUrquidez that the self-incrimination privilege is a trial right.29 He quickly
concluded thatMartinez had no Fifth Amendment claim because the state
never initiated any criminal proceedings against him and never compelled
him to give formal testimony.30 Justice Thomas went on to explain why the
Ninth Circuit's holding could not “be reconciled with our case law.”31 He
characterized the Court's precedents as standing for the idea that “the
government may compel witnesses to testify at trial or before a grand jury,
on pain of contempt, so long as the witness is not the target of the criminal
case in which he testifies.”32 It followed, according to Justice Thomas, that
“mere coercion does not violate the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause
absent use of the compelled statements in a criminal case against the
witness.”33
Justice Thomas next considered the significance of “prophylactic
rules designed to safeguard the core constitutional right protected by the
Self-Incrimination Clause.”34 The first such rule is “an evidentiary
privilege that protects witnesses from being forced to give incriminating
testimony, even in noncriminal cases, unless that testimony has been
immunized from use and derivative use in a future criminal proceeding.”35
The second is “the Miranda exclusionary rule,”36 which Justice Thomas
described as prophylactic without mentioning the Court’s holding in
Dickerson that “Miranda is a constitutional decision”37 – a statement that,
while admittedly ambiguous, is nonetheless relevant to whether Miranda

L. REV. 1731, 1749-53, 1820-24 (1991); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999) [hereinafter Jeffries, Right-Remedy].
29
Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2000-01 (plurality opinion) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V)
(emphasis added by the Court).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 2001.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 2002. Justice Thomas also declared that Martinez's probable lack of knowledge
that the compelled statement could not be used against him made no difference, because his
ignorance did not increase the degree of compulsion and he would receive “automatic
protection” from the use in criminal proceedings of that statement or evidence derived from
it. Id. at 2002 (emphasis in original).
34
Id. at 2003.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).
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can support a § 1983 claim.38
Because prophylactic rules “do not extend the scope of the
constitutional right itself,” Justice Thomas declared, “violations [of these
rules] do not violate the constitutional rights of any person.”39 More to the
point, Justice Thomas asserted that Chavez’s failure to comply with
Miranda “did not violate Martinez’s constitutional rights and cannot be
grounds for a § 1983 action.”40 In short, Chavez’s interrogation of Martinez
outside Miranda could not support a damages claim under the Fifth
Amendment.
Justice Thomas moved quickly to insist that his analysis “do[es] not
mean that police torture or other abuse that results in a confession is
constitutionally permissible so long as the statements are not used at trial.”41
Rather, any claims would simply arise under due process.42 Justice Thomas
also asserted that his switch to due process analysis was consistent with
Graham v. Connor, which held that claims of excessive force during any
“seizure” of a person must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not
due process, because the Fourth Amendment “provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection.”43 Justice Thomas explained that if
Martinez could bring a claim under the privilege, then he should not be able
to bring a claim under due process, but if he had no privilege claim, due
process might be available.44
38

See id. at 446, 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the ambiguity of the majority
opinion); Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in
Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 899-902 (2001) (same). For assessments of Dickerson
that contend Miranda is a constitutional and a prophylactic ruling, see WELSH S. WHITE,
MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON
109-11 (2001); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1030 (2001) [hereinafter Klein, Identifying]; David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution,
and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958 (2001).
39
Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2003 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas’s discussion of immunity
seems in tension with his concurring opinion in United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 4956 (2000), in which he relied on original understandings to suggest that the privilege
prohibits compelled production of documents in criminal investigations absent immunity.
40
Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004 (plurality opinion).
41
Id.
42
See id
43
490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842
(1998) (characterizing Graham as holding that the availability of any specific constitutional
claim precludes reliance on due process).
44
See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004 & n.5 (plurality opinion). For criticisms of Graham, see
Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court‘s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS L.J. 303, 399-407 (2001); Toni

Constitutional Interpretation and Coercive Interrogation

11

On the one hand, this explanation is inconsistent with Graham if the
privilege is an “explicit textual source of protection” against coercive
interrogation. On the other hand, if Justice Thomas’s trial right
interpretation of the privilege is correct, then it does not protect against
custodial coercion outside the trial, and his statement is consistent with
Graham. More interesting is the fact that the other five justices – all of
whom seem to agree that the privilege provides at least some protection
against coercive interrogation – did not even consider Graham’s application
to Martinez’s claims. With only four justices willing to invoke Graham and
the apparent willingness of other justices to allow overlapping constitutional
claims, one might plausibly conclude thatGr aham’s doctrinal significance
is shaky.45
As Justice Thomas analyzed the substantive due process issue, two
claims were available to Martinez. 46 The first was that the interrogation
“shocked the conscience.”47 The “’most likely’” foundation for such a
claim is conduct that was, first, “’intended to injure’” and, second,
“’unjustifiable by any government interest.’”48 Justice Thomas found no
evidence of intent to injure.49 He also asserted that “the need to investigate
whether there had been police misconduct constituted a justifiable
government interest given the risk that key evidence would have been lost if
Martinez had died [without telling] his side of the story.”50
The second substantive due process claim that Justice Thomas
M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court’s “Jot for Jot” Account of Substantive Due
Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086 (1998); Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes:
Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 833 (2003). See also Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal
Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1, 75-76 (2001) (arguing for due process as a source of some criminal
procedure doctrines precisely because it is more general than the Fifth Amendment).
45
See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE
CONSTITUTION 41 (2003 Supp.) (highlighting the fact that in Chavez, “by contrast [with
Graham], although six justices addressed and rejected the claim under the Fifth
Amendment, a majority of the Court expressed a willingness to have the claim addressed as
a matter of substantive due process”).
46
Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined this part of the opinion. Justice
O’Connor did not join Justice Thomas’s discussion of due process and did not express any
view on the issue.
47
The “shocks the conscience” standard originated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), and the Court applied it to a § 1983 police misconduct claim in Lewis, 523 U.S.
833.
48
Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849).
49
Id. at 2005.
50
Id.
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considered was that Chavez’s interrogation of Martinez deprived him of a
fundamental right under circumstances that would not satisfy strict scrutiny.
Justice Thomas insisted on a “’careful description’” of any potential
fundamental right.51 But he then interpreted Martinez’s claim broadly and
found “no basis in our prior jurisprudence or in our Nation’s history and
traditions to suppose that freedom from unwanted police questioning is so
fundamental that it cannot be abridged absent a ‘compelling state
interest.’”52
Significantly, Justice Thomas failed to consider whether Martinez’s
statements were voluntary, even though that issue had been central to the
lower courts’ analysis. Due process prohibits the use at trial of involuntary
statements – a protection that is distinct from the Self-Incrimination
Clause.53 Language in some of the due process cases also suggests a
substantive right to be free of coercive interrogation that produces an
involuntary statement regardless of whether the government seeks to use the
statement at trial.54 Moreover, some lower courts have allowed § 1983
actions based on violations of the due process voluntariness test.55
51

Id. at 2006 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
Id. Justice Thomas noted the Court should take account of Martinez’s medical condition
and the urgency of the situation, and his ultimate analysis referred to “these
circumstances,” id., but his reasoning turned on the supposed assertion of a broad right to
be free from unwanted police questioning.
53
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-34 (2000); Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 163 (1986); WHITE, supra note 38, at 39-51.
54
See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-67 (characterizing exclusion of testimony as a remedy for
unconstitutionally coercive interrogation tactics and thereby suggesting that the
interrogation and not the admission of testimony was the focus of due process); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (stating a confession obtained “through the use of
threats is violative of due process”); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (stating
violent interrogation “serves no lawful purpose, invalidates confessions that otherwise
would be convincing, and is universally condemned by the law”); Williams v. United
States, 341 U.S. 97, 101 (1951) (stating violent interrogation methods “deprive[] the victim
of a right under the Constitution”); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (conceding violent interrogation “per se, is an outlaw”); Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1940) (“The Constitution proscribes such lawless means
irrespective of the end.”); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (describing
interrogation methods as “revolting to the sense of justice”); see also WHITE, supra note
38, at 39-48; John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should
Torture be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 743, 748-51 (2002).
55
See Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946, 952-54 (8th Cir. 2001); Edwards v.
Pretsch, 180 F. Supp. 2d 499, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Susan R. Klein, No Time for Silence,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1348 n.61 (2003) [hereinafter Klein, Silence] (collecting earlier
cases); Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause
and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 434-44, 449-50 (1994)
52
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Whether Justice Thomas simply chose not to consider the
voluntariness issue, whether he thought it was irrelevant to the substantive
due process claim, or whether he thought it was subsumed within the shocks
the conscience inquiry, is unclear. In previous cases, however, the Court
has indicated that compulsion for purposes of the privilege is the same as
involuntariness for purposes of due process,56 which could mean that the
Chavez plurality saw no reason to consider voluntariness once it had
finished with the privilege. Notably, moreover, in his discussion of the selfincrimination claim, Justice Thomas dismissed Mincey v. Arizona – upon
which the district court and court of appeals had relied and which Justices
Kennedy and Ginsburg would cite in their opinions – as “a case addressing
the admissibility of a coerced confession under the Due Process Clause.”57
His failure to consider the voluntariness claim as an independent basis for
damages, combined with his characterization of Mincey as a case solely
about admissibility of evidence, supports the idea that Justice Thomas
believes a due process involuntary confession claim is different from a
substantive due process claim and cannot support at § 1983 action, perhaps
because, as a procedural or fair trial claim, it is the functional equivalent of
a compelled confession claim under the privilege.58
Justice Souter delivered a two part opinion. The second part was a
majority opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, and itstate d simply that the viability of Martinez’s substantive due
process claim would be an issue for remand.59 The first part, joined only by
[hereinafter Klein, Deconstitutionalized] (collecting cases and discussing efforts to obtains
damages for violations of Miranda); see also Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of
Constitutional Confession Law – The International Arena, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 889-95 (2003)
(suggesting the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Colorado v. Connelly is the doctrinal
source for due process damages claims relating to confessions).
56
See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307, 309 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654 (1984). For additional discussion of this issue, see infra notes 259-62 and
accompanying text.
57
Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004 n.4 (plurality opinion) (discussing Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385 (1978)) (emphasis in original).
58
See also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 9, at 8 (arguing the due process involuntary
confession cases are about fair trial procedures); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 17, Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003) (No. 011444) (same).
59
Id. at 2008 (majority opinion). Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg joined this part
of the opinion to ensure a controlling judgment. See id. at 2012-13 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2018 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 2019-20 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia’s opinion took issue with the idea that Martinez’s substantive due process claim
remained alive on remand. He read the Ninth Circuit’s opinion – correctly, in my view –
as ruling in part that Martinez had a valid substantive due process claim, and he joined
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Justice Breyer, explained how they reached that holding. Justice Souter
began by agreeing with the plurality that Martinez could not bring a § 1983
claim based on the Fifth Amendment or Miranda. His reasoning, however,
was quite different from that of the plurality. According to Justice Souter,
grants of immunity and allowing witnesses to invoke the privilegeoutside
the criminal trial – as well as Miranda – are all “Fifth Amendment
holdings” even if they are also “outside the Fifth Amendment’s core.”60
Presumably for that reason, Justice Souter refused to state that a violation of the Fifth Amendment or Miranda could never support a § 1983
claim. Rather, he found only that Martinez had failed to make “the
‘powerful showing’ . . . necessary to expand protection of the privilege
against self-incrimination to the point of civil liability he asks us to
recognize here.”61 As a result, Justice Souter agreed that Martinez could
only bring a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.
Referring to Justice Stevens’s separate opinion, he said simply that
“Martinez has a strong argument in support of such a position” and held that
the validity of the claim was a matter for remand.62

Justice Thomas’s opinion seeking to reverse that ruling. Id. at 2008-09 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part in the judgment). Justice Scalia also asserted that, if the Ninth Circuit
had not addressed the substantive due process claim, Martinez had waived it by not raising
it before the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 2009-10.
60
Id. at 2007 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
61
Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 515, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Justice Souter did not directly address the relevance of the due process involuntary
confession cases, but he seemed to equate them with the privilege. After noting Martinez’s
testimony “would clearly be inadmissible” as a matter of due process under Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), see Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2006 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment), he distinguished the exclusion remedy from the damages remedy. “To
recognize such a constitutional cause of action for compensation would, of course, be well
outside the core of Fifth Amendment protection.” Id. at 2006-07. Yet he then suggested
that Chavez’s conduct might be sufficient to support a damages claim as a matter of
substantive due process. Id. at 2008. If Justice Souter meant to say that all involuntary
statements support a substantive due process claim for damages, he presumably would
have said so clearly, and such a result would have made his careful discussion of the
privilege largely irrelevant from a plaintiffs’ or remedial standpoint because damages
would be available for the same conduct under due process. Thus, Justice Souter probably
meant to recognize two tiers of due process claims – those that qualify for the exclusion
remedy, and those that also qualify for damages. Where he would draw the line between
the two was also left unsaid.
62
Id. at 2008. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833 (1998), which held government interests can justify government conduct that
otherwise would violate substantive due process rights. Having seen Justice Thomas’s
straightforward application of that idea in Chavez, see 123 S. Ct. at 2005, while also
sympathizing with Justice Stevens’ views, Justice Souter may have decided it would be
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Carefully read, Justice Souter’s opinion asserts that Miranda and
other doctrines that protect the core trial right of the privilege against selfincrimination are themselves interpretations of the Constitution and are not
merely prophylactic or non-constitutional. His reliance on Justice Harlan’s
Miranda dissent underscores that the question for him was whether to
expand protection of Fifth Amendment rights by allowing an additional
remedy beyond the exclusionary rule for their violation. Put differently, his
focus was on the appropriate remedy as well as, to some extent, on the
relationship of remedies to the scope of rights, and his opinion is largely an
example of exercising discretion to select an appropriate remedy for a
constitutional violation.63
Justice Stevens, in turn, directly contested Justice Thomas’s
discussion of substantive due process and his failureto consider the due
process voluntariness cases. He noted that the Court has found in numerous
cases that “unusually coercive police interrogation procedures” violate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.64 He declared that the
interrogation of Martinez “was the functional equivalent of an attempt to
obtain an involuntary confession from a prisoner by torturous means” and
was thus “a classic example of a violation of a constitutional right ‘implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.’”65 Justice Stevens also took Justice
Thomas to task for characterizing Miranda as prophylactic and nonconstitutional in apparent defiance of Dickerson.66 For all of his focus on
due process, however, Justice Stevens never said clearly which due process
claims should support a damages cause of action, perhaps because he felt
the facts of this case easily supported a claim for damages.
better to remain silent rather than seek in this case to resolve the tension between the two
positions.
63
See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 282
(2000) (arguing for greater consideration of alternatives to damages in civil rights actions
and modification of qualified immunity doctrine to obtain this result) [hereinafter Jeffries,
Disaggregating]; cf. Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution:
Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used
Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907 (1989) (arguing for a more sensitive consideration of the
source and scope of various criminal procedure rights in order to provide the most
appropriate remedies for their violation). Whether the exclusionary rule is a sufficient
remedy by itself for Fifth Amendment violations is doubtful, especially in the Miranda
context, where the incentives favor police disregard of the required warnings. See Steven
D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 502-25 (2002)
(examining the incentives to violate Miranda and concluding they overwhelm the
incentives to comply in many instances); Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1355-57 (same).
64
Id. at 2011 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65
Id. at 2010, 2012 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
66
Id. at 2012-13 n.3.
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Insisting that “[a] constitutional right is traduced the moment torture
or its close equivalents are brought to bear,” Justice Kennedy dissented
from the Court’srejection of Martinez’s self -incrimination claim.67 First,
however, he concurred in the plurality’s conclusion that a Miranda violation
can never support a § 1983 claim. Yet unlike Justice Thomas, he cited
Dickerson for the idea that the Miranda warnings are “a constitutional
requirement.”68 The reason why a violation of Miranda cannot support a §
1983 claim, therefore, is not the lack of a constitutional violation. Instead,
the question – as it had been for Justice Souter – was one of remedial
discretion. The exclusionary rule, according to Justice Kennedy, “is a
complete and sufficient remedy.”69
Although a Miranda violation could not support a § 1983 claim,
Justice Kennedy insisted that Chavez had violated the Fifth Amendment
because the Self-Incrimination Clause is more than a trial right. Rather, it is
“a substantive constraint on the conduct of the government, not merely an
evidentiary rule governing the work of the courts.”70 The substantive aspect
of the Clause “protects an individual from being forced to give answers
demanded by an official in any context when the answers might give rise to
criminal liability in the future.”71 Moreover, relying on Kastigar v. United
States, Justice Kennedy stated that the privilege against self-incrimination
applies whenever a “testimonial duty” arises, whether “’civil or criminal,
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory.’”72 Finally, the
relevance of “what the witness reasonably believes will be the future use of
a statement . . . indicates the existence of a present right.”73 Although he
did not say so directly, Justice Kennedy clearly took issue with Justice
Thomas’s assertion that the ability to invoke the privilege in non-criminal
proceedings is only prophylactic and is not a constitutional aspect of the
Self-Incrimination Clause.
Justice Kennedy sought to bolster his argument by appealing to
popular understandings of the privilege:
67

Id. at 2013 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000)).
69
Id.; see supra note 63.
70
Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2014 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Kennedy recognized that Justices Thomas and Souter had relied on United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), but he asserted the case was inapposite because it
addressed concerns different from those at issue in Chavez. See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at
2014-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71
Id. at 2014.
72
Id. (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972)).
73
Id.
68
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It should come as an unwelcome surprise to judges,
attorneys, and the citizenry as a whole that if a legislative
committee or a judge in a civil case demands incriminating
testimony without offering immunity, and even imposes
sanctions for failure to comply, that the witness and counsel
cannot insist the right against compelled self-incrimination is
applicable then and there.74
Moreover,
To tell our whole legal system that when conducting a
criminal investigation police officials can use severe
compulsion or even torture with no present violation of the
right against compelled self-incrimination can only diminish
a celebrated provision in the Bill of Rights. A Constitution
survives over time because the people share a common,
historic commitment to certain simple but fundamental
principles which preserve their freedom.75
Ultimately, Justice Kennedy insisted that these basic understandings support
the conclusion that the Self-Incrimination Clause prohibits “the act of
torturing to obtain a confession.”76
Justice Kennedy recognized that a majority disagreed with him and
preferred due process as the vehicle for considering Martinez’s claims. But
that disagreement, he contended, should not affect the outcome of the case:
Turning to this essential, but less specific, guarantee, it seems
to me a simple enough matter to say that use of torture or its
equivalent in an attempt to induce a statement violates an
individual’s fundamental right to liberty of the person. The
Constitution does not countenance the official imposition of
severe pain or pressure for purposes of interrogation. This is
true whether the protection is found in the Self-Incrimination
Clause, the broader guarantees of the Due Process Clause, or
both.77
Justice Kennedy admitted that the police “may have legitimate reasons,
born of exigency, to question a person who is suffering or in distress.” He
insisted, however, that the police may not – as Chavez did – “prolong a
suspect’s suffering against the suspect’s will,” “give the impression that
severe pain will be alleviated only if the declarant cooperates,” or otherwise
74

Id. at 2015.
Id.
76
Id. at 2016.
77
Id.
75
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“exploit [a suspect’s] pain and suffering with the purpose and intent of
securing an incriminating statement.”78
Although Justice Kennedy supported damages for violations of
either the privilege or the due process clauses that result from “severe pain
or pressure for purposes of interrogation,”79 he, too, did not discuss the
overall relationship between damages claims and confessions that are
involuntary as a matter of due process. Like Justice Stevens, he may have
thought exploration of this issue was unnecessary on the facts of this case.
Yet his position that damages should be available for violations of the
privilege creates the possibility thathe would also support damages for a
broad range of involuntary confessions.
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the SelfIncrimination and Due Process Clauses.80 She would have gone farther,
however. To Justice Ginsburg, the case did not turn on Martinez’s beliefs
about the connection between medical treatment and giving a statement, or
on Chavez’s intentions.81 Rather, as in Mincey v. Arizona, the record made
clear that “’the totality of the circumstances in this case’ establishes ‘that
[Martinez’s] statement was not voluntarily given.’ It is indeed ‘hard to
imagine a situation less conducive to the exercise of a rational intellect and
a free will.’”82 Although she did not say that damages should be available
any time a statement “was not voluntarily given,” Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion comes closest to suggesting that violation of the due process
voluntariness test will support a claim for damages.
The Court’s opinions in Chavez reveal important divisions and
tensions in criminal procedure and civil rights jurisprudence. Less clear is
whether any of them helps chart a path toward resolution of these tensions.
III. CHAVEZ AND THE DESTABILIZATION OF SELF-INCRIMINATION DOCTRINE
The Chavez plurality sought to restrict the privilege against selfincrimination, cast doubt on the status of Miranda only three years after
Dickerson, and – in a startling move – suggested that the grant of immunity
for compelled testimony is nothing more than a non-constitutional
prophylactic rule. Although reasonable minds can certainly differ about the
proper scope of the privilege, the plurality’s analysis is flawed, and the root
78

Id. at 2017.
Id. at 2016.
80
Id. at 2018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She did not express
a view on the status of Miranda or its ability to support a § 1983 action.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 2019 (quoting Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2018 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978))).
79
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of the flaw is the plurality’s – and, indeed, the entire Court’s– difficulty
grappling with the place of remedies in constitutional law.
A. The Uncertain Scope of the Privilege
For the Chavez plurality, the privilege against self-incrimination is a
trial right, by which they mean that a compelled confession implicates the
Fifth Amendment only when the government seeks to introduce it at trial.
The privilege is irrelevant as a source of enforceable rights if the
government never seeks to introduce the confession. For Justices Souter
and Breyer, the core of the privilege is the trial right, but it also sweeps
more broadly. Only Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg clearly embraced an
expansive conception of the privilege as a robustconstraint on conduct
outside the trial. And only they would have used the Fifth Amendment to
hold that Chavez’s conduct violated the Constitution.
The text of the privilege – “No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself”83 – feeds the Court’s
uncertainty. The Chavez plurality plausibly contended that these words
apply only when a person is “prose cuted for a crime” and do not extend to
“the entire criminal investigatory process, including police
interrogations.”84 Others, however, have read the text more broadly and
equally plausibly to include, at least, “a person haled before a grand jury,
who is already the subject of a complaint or is believed by the prosecutor to
be a likely subject for indictment” and “any witness in criminal
proceedings.”85
The original understanding of the privilege also creates uncertainty,
in part because it reveals a legal context dramatically and perhaps

83

U.S. CONST. amend V.
Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2000; see also id. at 2000-01 (“In our view, a ‘criminal case’ at the
very least requires the initiation of legal proceedings. We need not decide today the precise
moment when a ‘criminal case’ commences; it is enough to say that police questioning
does not constitute a ‘case’ any more than a private investigator’s precomplaint activities
constitute a ‘civil case.’”).
85
Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 676 (1968). Judge Friendly also included “the
preliminary hearing before a magistrate of a person against whom a complaint has been
filed,” id., but the Chavez plurality’s interpretation seems to include preliminary hearings.
For a roughly consistent discussion of the text’s possibilities, see Clymer, supra note 63, at
459-61. For a compelling argument that the word “witness” in both the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments leads to the conclusion that the privilege bars the use of “compelled pretrial
statements as evidence of guilt,” see Donald A. Dripps, Against Police Interrogation – And
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CIMINOLOGY 699, 724 n.95
(1988) [hereinafter Dripps, Against].
84
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irretrievably different from our own.86 Thus, some commentators have
argued the privilege applies to pretrial custodial interrogation because such
questioning is the modern-day equivalent of founding-era pretrial
examination by magistrates.87 Yet application of the privilege (or its
common law precursors) to pretrial examination in the founding era was
uncertain. To the extent the privilege prohibited torture and examination
under oath but not unsworn examination,88 it plainly applied in some pretrial contexts, but the allowance of unsworn testimony makes the analogy
less exact than some of its proponents might desire. Moreover, other
commentators use the original understanding against the privilege,
suggesting it is outdated if its primary purpose was to prevent torture.89
Against these uncertainties, which create space for the plurality’s
interpretation, standsa host of cases, stretching back over a century, that
allow invocation of the privilege outside of criminal trials and outside the
criminal process altogether.90 As Justice Rehnquist explained in Michigan
v. Tucker,
Where there has been genuine compulsion of testimony, the
right has been given broad scope. Although the
constitutional language in which the privilege is cast might
be construed to apply only to situations in which the
prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against
himself at his criminal trial, its application has not been so
limited. The right has been held applicable to proceedings
before a grand jury, to civil proceedings, to congressional
investigations, to juvenile proceedings, and to other statutory
86

See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996). For other accounts, see Lawrence Herman,
The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule, Part I, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (1992), Part II, 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1992); Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086 (1994).
87
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 438 (1987)
[hereinafter Schulhofer, Reconsidering]; Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney
General on the Law of Pretrial Interrogation, reprinted in 22 MICH. J. L. REF. 437, 494
(1989).
88
See Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2651-53; see also Herman, Part I, supra note 86, at 16263 (providing a consistent assessment of the pre-revolutionary era).
89
See David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?,
33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1077-79 (1986). For actual cases of torture, critics of the
privilege rely on the due process clauses for a remedy. See id. at 1079-80.
90
For a discussion of the cases, see Clymer, supra note 63, at 459; infra notes 96-103 and
accompanying text.
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inquiries.91
Against this background, the Chavez plurality’s suggestion that the
constitutional scope of the privilege should be limited to a defendant’s
testimony in criminal prosecutions would dramatically reengineer Fifth
Amendment doctrine. Absent a strongjustification for such a move – and
few judges or scholars would argue that text or original understanding
alone, even if clear, is sufficient in the face of longstanding practice and
precedent92 – we must look elsewhere to determine the proper scope of the
privilege.
Given the longstanding precedent in favor of a privilege broader
than a criminal trial right, one might plausibly look to the Court’s own
words for a more certain understanding of the privilege. Yet caselaw ends
up pointing in inconsistent directions. Cases from the Warren Court
describe a strongprivilege that constrains p olice conduct well before trial.
One of the farthest reaching cases is Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,
which sets out a list of “polices of the privilege” intended to drive the
development of doctrine:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair stateindividual balance by requiring the government to leave the
individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him
and by requiring the government in its contest with the
individual to shoulder the entire load[;]" our respect for the
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life[;]" our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our
91

417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) (emphasis added and citations omitted).
Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(suggesting “stare decisis and reliance interests” may make it “too late in the day” to return
to the original understanding of the commerce clause), and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
against overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), even if it contravenes the text of
the Constitution, because “the question is . . . close,” Hans has been “consistently adhered
to for almost a century,” and it has had a “pervasive effect upon statutory law”), with
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-56 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting
original understandings of the privilege against self incrimination could require revision of
existing doctrine to provide broader protection for documents).
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realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to
the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."93
Under Murphy’s interpretation of these somewhat vague policies, the
plurality’s analysis in Chavez is insupportable.
Two years after Murphy, the Court reaffirmed the expansive view of
the Fifth Amendment in Miranda v. Arizona. The Court described the
privilege “in part as an individual’s substantive right, a ‘right to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life.’”94 As a result, the Court insisted
that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available
outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way
from being compelled to incriminate themselves.”95 Even leaving aside the
constitutional status of the Miranda warnings, this conception of the
privilege is inconsistent with that of the Chavez plurality and perhaps finds
resonance only in the opinions of Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg.
Worth noting, as well, is that the Warren Court cases drew on a
tradition of judicial celebration of the privilege. These laudatory statements
describe the privilege as a broad right and often as a powerful constraint on
government conduct wherever it takes place. As early as 1886, in Boyd v.
United States, the Courtdeclared that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
together stand for the following proposition:
[A]ny compulsory discovery by extorting the party’s oath, or
compelling the production of his private books and papers, to
convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to
the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the
instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of
an American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power; but
it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and
personal freedom.96
So, too, in Brown v. Walker, in the course of upholding the statutory
93

378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55)..
95
Id. at 467.
96
116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886). Six years later, the Court toned down the rhetoric but
insisted that the privilege – which it described as “an ancient principle of the law of
evidence” – “must have a broad construction in favor of the right which it was intended to
secure.” Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562, 563 (1892); see also id. at 584-85
(noting “the manifest purpose of the constitutional provisions, both of the States and of the
United States, . . . to prohibit the compelling of testimony of a self-criminating kind from a
party or a witness,” and requiring a “liberal construction” for “constitutional provisions for
the protection of personal rights”).
94
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immunity provisions applicable to Interstate Commerce Commission
proceedings, the Court emphasized the importance of the privilege:
So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress
themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the
States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question
an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a
maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence,
became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a
constitutional enactment.97
The Court concluded its opinion by declaring that the privilege “is justly
regarded as one of the valuable prerogatives of the citizen.”98
Bram v. United States applied the privilege to a statement obtained
during custodial interrogation. The Court endorsed the language and
reasoning of Boyd and Brown, and stated that, at common law, the privilege
“was there considered as resting on the law of nature, and was embedded in
that system as one of its great and distinguishing attributes.”99 Because
97

161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896). The Court also provided the following justification for the
privilege:
While the admissions or confession of the prisoner, when voluntarily and
freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of criminating
evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent
connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the
questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation
to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to
push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which
is so painfully evident in may of the earlier [British] trials . . . made the
system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.
Id. at 597.
98
Id. at 610; see also ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478-80 (1894) (relying on Boyd and
Counselman to hold the privilege applies to administrative proceedings). The dissenters in
Brown would have held that the transactional immunity provided by the statute could not
displace the privilege. Justice Field observed that “[t]he reprobation of compulsory selfincrimination is an established doctrine of our society” that reflects “’the long struggle
between the opposing forces of the spirit of individual liberty . . . and the collective power
of the State.’” Brown, 161 U.S. at 637 (Field, J., dissenting). He also contended that “the
essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own guilt is obvious to
every one,” and he decried the “sense of personal degradation” that accompanied
compelled incrimination. Id. The Brimson dissenters appear to have agreed with the Fifth
Amendment holding, but they disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that a contempt
proceeding for refusal to comply with an administrative investigation is an Article III case
or controversy. See ICC v. Brimson, 155 U.S. 3, 4 (1894) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
99
168 U.S. 532, 545 (1897). The Court also ruled that the constitutional privilege follows
the common law rule, which it described in the following way:
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Bram’s statements were not “the result of a purely voluntary mental action”
and rather were “the result of either hope or fear, or both, operating on the
mind,” the Court found the confession involuntary and remanded for a new
trial at which the confession would be inadmissible.100
Even Twining v. New Jersey, which rejected incorporation of the
privilege against the states in 1908, described it as “universal in American
law . . . [,] a protection to the innocent though a shelter to the guilty, and a
safeguard against heedless, unfounded, or tyrannical prosecutions.”101
Although the Court concluded the privilege is not sufficiently fundamental
to be incorporated through due process, the Court nonetheless recognized it
as “a just and useful principle of law.”102 Far from being an aberrational
departure from contrary baseline rules, in other words, the arguments of
Murphy and Miranda draw on a line of precedent that declared and sought

Looking at the doctrine as thus established, it would seem plainly to be
deducible that as the principle from which, under the law of nature, it was
held that one accused could not be compelled to testify against himself,
was in its essence comprehensive enough to exclude all manifestations of
compulsion, whether arising from torture or from moral causes, the rule
formulating the principle with logical accuracy, came to be so stated as to
embrace all cases of compulsion which were covered by the doctrine. As
the facts by which compulsion might manifest itself, whether physical or
moral, would be necessarily ever different, the measure by which the
involuntary nature of the confession was to be ascertained was stated in
the rule, not by the changing causes, but by their resultant effect upon the
mind . . . .
Id. at 548.
100
Id. at 562. Three justices dissented.
101
211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
102
Id. at 107. In rejecting incorporation, the Court reasoned that (1) the privilege was
insufficiently recognized as a matter of British and American history in the founding era,
see id. at 102-09, (2) of all the rights litigants had claimed should apply at civil or criminal
trials as a matter of due process – including trial by jury – the Court had at that time only
found two: the court should have jurisdiction and the parties should have notice and the
opportunity to be heard, see id. at 110-11, and (3) there is disagreement over the value of
the privilege and in any event “it cannot be ranked with [“immutable principle[s] of
justice” such as] the right to hearing before condemnation, the immunity from arbitrary
power not acting by general laws, and the inviolability of private property,” id. at 113. The
second reason suggests a trial right interpretation, but only the third reason hints at
disagreement with the privilege itself, and the Court was careful not to endorse the
“doubt[s]” about the value of the privilege that it traced to “the days of Bentham.” Id.
Rather, the Court suggested that the privilege “is best defended not as an unchangeable
principle of universal justice but as a law proved by experience to be expedient.” Id. In
dissent, the first Justice Harlan relied on Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-33, as support for
incorporation.
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to justify an expansive privilege.103
Importantly, however, the Warren Court cases also provide an
alternate approach. In a series of dissents, Justice Harlan agreed that the
privilege is a set of “basic principles capable of expansion” depending on
the Court’s “policy choices.”104 But Justice Harlan urged a more focused
and pragmatic balancing of interests in place of the broad generalities of
Murphy. The policy choice, he said, must recognize “the essential tension
that springs from the uncertain mandate which this provision of the
Constitution gives to this Court.”105 Thus, the Court must balance “the
history and purposes of the privilege [with] the character and urgency of the
other public interests involved.”106 Proponents of an expanded privilege
must make a “powerful showing that [the] new rules are plainly desirable in
the context of our society . . . before those rules are engrafted onto the
Constitution.”107 Judge Friendly’s criticism of the Warren Court’s privilege

103

At least three caveats are also worth noting. First, although the privilege long has been
celebrated, the celebration has never been unanimous. Thus, in Palko v. Connecticut,
Justice Cardozo suggested doubts about the need for the privilege as a trial right while also
endorsing constitutional limits on custodial interrogation:
[The privilege] might be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as in
the past there are students of our penal system who look upon the
immunity as a mischief rather than a benefit, and who would limit its
scope or destroy it altogether. No doubt there would remain the need to
give protection against torture, physical or mental. Justice, however,
would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to
orderly inquiry.
302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (citations omitted); see also Twining, 211 U.S. at 113 (“The
wisdom of the exemption has never been universally assented to since the days of
Bentham; many doubt it to-day”). Second, these dissenting views ensured that
incorporation of the privilege against the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964),
would be controversial. For some, at least, it remains so today. See Dripps, Against, supra
note 85 (suggesting “disincorporation”). Third, celebration of the privilege in older cases
does not justify the privilege by itself. See Friendly, supra note 85, at 679 (arguing rhetoric
like that quoted in the text amounts to “eloquent phrases . . . accepted as a substitute for
thorough thought”). Yet these celebrations deserve more consideration than they
commonly receive from critics of the privilege. See infra notes 198-218 and accompanying
text.
104
Id. at 511 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
105
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 450 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Murphy,
378 U.S. at 81 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Almost entirely absent from the
statement of ‘policies’ is any reference to the particular problem of this case; at best, the
statement suggests the set of values which are on one side of the issue.”).
106
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 523 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
107
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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cases sounded similar themes.108 Under this analysis, the privilege is more
than a criminal trial right, but only when circumstances warrant its
expansion.
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court signaled a third
approach that rejected, not just Murphy, but any expansive view of the
privilege. Writing for the Court in a case about the extraterritorial
application of the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist paused “to
note that it operates in a different manner than the Fifth Amendment, which
is not at issue in this case.”109 He explained that “[t]he privilege against
self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants.
Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately
impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.”110
The Verdugo-Urquidez dictum draws on several sources. First, of
course, is a reading of the text that limits the privilege to trial proceedings.
Second, perhaps, is a sense that the balance of policies advocated by Justice
Harlan weighs clearly against an expansive privilege. Third, the facts of
many self-incrimination cases present issues of admissibility. In these
cases, the Court is, of necessity, discussing the application of the privilege
at trial and so it is an easy step to describe the privilege as only a trial right.
Moreover, some earlier cases contain language that arguably described the
privilege as only a trial right. Thus, in Oregon v. Elstad, the Courtsaid that
“the prosecution has actually violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment
rights” when it “introduce[s] an inadmissible confession at trial.”111
Whatever the source for Chief Justice Rehnquist’s assertion, Martinezhas
no Fifth Amendment complaint under the trial right approach – indeed, no
one whose testimony is compelled in any way, even without a grant of
immunity, has cause to complain under the privilege so long as the
testimony is not introduced at a criminal trial.
The most recent case to address these issues in any detail before
Chavez was United States v. Balsys, but Balsys simply muddied the waters.
108

See Friendly, supra note 85, at 679-98; see also HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS
266-84 (1967).
109
494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).
110
494 U.S. at 264. Because the privilege was not at issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
words were dicta, but later decisions have cited the statement as the foundation for limiting
the scope of the privilege. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (quoting
Verdugo-Urquidez to describe the privilege as “”a fundamental trial right’”). Chief Justice
Rehnquist cited Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972), as support for the
claim that a violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs only at trial. As I explain at infra
note 192, however, a fair reading of Kastigar does not support that claim.
111
470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985); see also id. at 306-07 (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits its
use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony.”).
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Justice Souter’s majority opinion declares that the Self-Incrimination
Clause “provide[s] a witness with the right against compelled self-incrimination when reasonably fearing prosecution by the government whose power
the Clause limits.”112 This language seems to treat the privilege as a right
extending beyond the criminal trial. Yet the Courtrefused to take that step;
instead it cited the contrary statement in Verdugo-Urquidez and merely
“assum[ed], arguendo” that the privilege creates more than a trial right.113
Similarly, the Court explicitly rejected Murphy’s expansive view of the
privilege but did not reject the idea that the scope of the privilege turns on
policy assessments. To the contrary, the Court said that Murphy’s flaw was
not the use of policy analysis but simply the failure “to weigh the host of
competing policy concerns that would be raised in a legitimate
reconsideration of the Clause’s scope.”114 Thus, Balsys gestures
simultaneously in the direction of Justice Harlan and Verdugo-Urquidez –
hardly a position of stability.
If the text provides no answer and precedent points in inconsistent
directions, then perhaps the solutions of other commentators will point the
true path. Two recent articles, however, suggest otherwise. First, Susan
Klein describes the privilege against self-incrimination as a trial right but
argues it “can be protected only by applying the privilege in any pretrial
setting where questioning may elicit an incriminating response.”115
Importantly, Klein does not explicitly say that the privilege applies as a
right in these situations; instead she adopts the argument, set out in
Michigan v. Tucker, that “an inability to protect the right at one stage of a
proceeding may make its invocation useless at a later stage.”116
Nonetheless, she insists that compelled incrimination in any of these
“pretrial settings” should be treated as a constitutional violation meriting
“injunctive and other relief.”117
Yet Klein stands on disputed ground with her insistence that
112

524 U.S. 666, 674 (1998). At issue in Balsys was whether a witness in a domestic
proceeding may invoke the privilege for fear that any incriminating testimony may be used
in a foreign prosecution. By a 7-2 vote, the Court answered no. For discussion of Balsys,
see Diane Marie Amann, International Decision – United States v. Balsys, 92 AM. J. INT’L
L. 759 (1998). For discussion of the privilege in international criminal law, see Diane
Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in an
International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201 (1998).
113
Id. at 691 n.12 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264).
114
Id. at 691.
115
Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1341.
116
417 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1974). The Tucker Court, however, described the ability to assert
the privilege outside the criminal trial as a “right.” See id. at 440.
117
Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1341.
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disregard of the privilege outside a criminal trial can violate the
Constitution if the privilege itselfis only a trial right. True, the best way to
protect the privilege may be to allow its invocation outside the trial, but that
reasoning simply mirrors the reasoning of Miranda, which imposed “proper
safeguards” to guarantee the core right.118 Klein’s analysis, in other words,
puts us into the same uncertain terrain of constitutional common law and
prophylactic rules thatMiran da inhabits, and she freely admits her
willingness to go there.119 In her view, which is well-argued and nuanced,
quasi-constitutional prophylactic rules are not theoretically troubling and –
perhaps more important – such rules are simply a necessary part of
constitutional adjudication.120 Although Klein is plainly correct that
prophylactic rules are part of contemporary constitutional interpretation, her
argument gives insufficient attention to whether there is really any
difference between prophylactic rules and other constitutional law.
Second, Steven Clymer argues that the privilege against selfincrimination is a trial right that bars admission of compelled testimony.121
He also argues thatthe Constitution requires the privilege to be available in
non-criminal contexts. The crucial point, he insists, is that no constitutional
violation exists until the government attempts to use a compelled statement
at trial.122 Yet the argument in support of this conclusion is a sleight of
hand. If the privilege may be asserted in non-criminal settings, but the right
not to incriminate oneself is violated only at trial, then there is no selfincrimination violation if the government ignores assertion of the privilege
prior to trial. Witnesses can invoke the privilege until they are blue in the
face, but that invocation will be meaningless unless a trial follows. In the
meantime, the government is free to compel statements because the
compulsion – by itself – does not violate the Constitution (subject, of
course, to possible due process constraints). What, then, does the
118

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
See Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1351-52 (arguing Miranda is constitutional
common law); see also Klein, Deconstitutionalized, supra note 55, at 481-88 (same);
Klein, Identifying, supra note 38, at 1032-33, 1037-44 (defining and providing examples of
“constitutional prophylactic rules”).
120
See id. at 1034-35.
121
See Clymer, supra note 63, at 449-50.
122
See id. at 459-65, 492-93. Clymer thus echoes Akhil Amar. See AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 206-207 n.55 (1997) (“it is this
introduction [of a compelled statement] that violates the Fifth Amendment”). Although I
am critical of Clymer’s trial right analysis, he is undoubtedly correct that the trial right
view is logical and has substantial support among the justices. I agree, moreover, with his
assertion that, if the privilege is ultimately a rule of admissibility, then we should at least
give it real force rather than create exceptions that undermine its effectiveness. See also
Loewy, supra note 63, at 927-28 (taking a similar approach to Miranda).
119
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Constitution really require outside the criminal trial?
Clymer may be suggesting the existence of a constitutional right
without a remedy. Or, he could mean that the ability to raise the privilege
outside a criminal trial is something less than a right. Perhaps it is a
“safeguard” based on the policy choice that it is better to allow the privilege
in non-criminal proceedings than to undermine the trial right. If that is true,
then Clymer and Klein end up in similar ter ritory, although both might deny
it: any rule that goes beyond prohibition of compelled testimony in a
criminal trial is a prophylactic safeguard, enforceable for Klein but
apparently not for Clymer.
Klein’s and Clymer’s arguments bring us back to the Chavez
plurality, which showed the same concern for distinguishing between the
core constitutional right and prophylactic rules, albeit with less nuance than
Klein and less sleight of hand than Clymer.
B. Prophylactic Rules and Self- Incrimination
Justice Thomas’s opinion followsVerdugo -Urquidez to reach the
same conclusion as Clymer: the privilege is a trial right, so that it cannot be
violated unless and until a compelled statement is “admitted as testimony . .
. in a criminal case.”123 But he quickly went beyond Clymer’s analysis.
Justice Thomas admitted that precedent allows assertion of the privilege in
“non-criminal cases” unless immunity is granted, but he insisted that
granting immunity is merely a “prophylactic rule[] designed to safeguard
the core constitutional right protected by the Self-Incrimination clause.”124
In other words, nothing in the Constitution requires grants of immunity or
allows assertion of the privilege outside the criminal process; the Court has
simply developed these rules to ensure that the constitutional right is
protected. These rules do not, however, “extend the scope of the
constitutional right itself, just as violations of judicially crafted prophylactic
rules do not violate the constitutional rights of any person.”125
Indeed, Justice Thomas signaled some openness to going farther.
His asserted that the privilege applies as a constitutional matter only “when
a ‘criminal case’ commences” but refused to specify when that happens –
except to say that “at the very least [it] requires the initiation of legal
123

Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2001 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2002 (“Mere coercion does
not violate the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements
in a criminal case against the witness”); id. at 2003 (“a violation of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against
himself in a criminal case”) (emphasis original).
124
Id. at 2002-03.
125
Id. at 2003.
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proceedings.”126 How, then, should we treat a grand jury proceeding? It is
a legal proceeding, but one could plausibly maintain that a “criminal case”
does not begin until the filing of formal charges.127 If that is true, then
under Justice Thomas’s analysis, the privilege does not apply in grand jury
proceedings as a matter of constitutional right.
Justice Thomas’s opinion provides additionalsupport for that
interpretation. He noted that the government can compel witnesses to
testify at trial or before a grand jury if they are not targets, and that they can
be compelled even if they are targets so long as they receive immunity.
Yet, he never described the receipt of immunity as a right; instead, it is
merely “well-established” by “case law.”128 Moreover, in the same
paragraph, he observed that government employees may be compelled to
testify on pain of losing their jobs only if they receive immunity, and he
described that protection as a prophylactic rule.129 The structure of this
paragraph of the opinion seems to exhibit a purposeful ambiguity. It tends
to the conclusion that all immunity is prophylactic, but it stops short of
saying so in plain words.
Unlike Clymer, then, Justice Thomas developed and embraced the
logical conclusions of the trial right argument. The Constitution clearly
requires only suppression of compelled statements at trial. Most of the
remaining doctrine, perhaps even all of it, is prophylactic. Importantly,
moreover – and here Justice Thomas diverges from Klein – prophylactic
rules are necessarily non-constitutional rules. Indeed, assuming Justice
Thomas still holds to the tenets of Justice Scalia’s Dickerson dissent –
which he joined – Congress can modify or reject prophylactic rules
126

Id. at 2000-01.
The beginning of a criminal case varies with the perspective of the people involved and
the context in which the question is asked. The best definition might include grand jury
proceedings, but the filing of formal charges by the prosecution is clearly a defensible
choice as well. For a variety of perspectives, see Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,
563 (1892) (“A criminal prosecution under article 6 of the amendments is much narrower
than a ‘criminal case,’ under article 5 of the amendments. It is entirely consistent with the
language of article 5, that the privilege of not being a witness against himself is to be
exercised in a proceeding before a grand jury.”); Fellers v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1019,
1022 (2004) (“The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered at or after the time that
judicial proceedings have been initiated . . . whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 2003) (holding the term
“criminal proceedings” includes grand jury proceedings for purposes of the material
witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144); AMAR, supra note 122, at 221-22 (arguing a criminal
case begins with the filing of charges against the defendant).
128
Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2001 (plurality opinion).
129
See id. at 2002 & n.2.
127
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precisely because they are not constitutional.130
In short, Justice Thomas categorized the doctrine of requiring
immunity for compelled self-incrimination in non-criminal cases – and
perhaps even in some criminal proceedings – as a non-constitutional rule
subject to congressional oversight. This assertion is literally unprecedented.
Before Chavez, the Court had insisted that the Constitution requires at least
use and derivative-use immunity in exchange for compelled, incriminating
testimony. Thus, in Kastigar v. United States, the Court considered the
constitutionality of the federal use immunity statute. If immunity were
simply a prophylactic doctrine, the result would have been obvious –
Congress could adopt whatever immunity statute it desired, including a
statute providing for no immunity. But the Court said that the existence of
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination required a
“constitutional inquiry” into “whether the immunity granted under this
statute is coextensive with the scope of the privilege.”131 If the immunity
statute was not “as comprehensive as the protection afforded by the
privilege, petitioners were justified in refusing to answer.”132 Put
differently, persons from whom the government seeks to compel
incriminating testimony have a constitutional right to silence or immunity in
equal amounts. Numerous cases before and after Kastigar also characterize
immunity in civil and criminal proceedings as a constitutional right.133
130

See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 445-47, 454 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The Court’s power to craft such rules, on the other hand, is far more troubling
to Justices Scalia and Thomas. See id. at 454, 457-461; see also Joseph D. Grano,
Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure, A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U.
L. REV. 100 (1985); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to
Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174 (1988). Cf. Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and
Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 25 (2001) (suggesting the
word “prophylactic” “inappropriately raises concerns of legitimacy where none should
exist”).
131
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972); see also id. at 453.
132
Id. at 449.
133
See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000) (stating “the scope of the ‘use and
derivative-use’ immunity that [the federal immunity statute] provides is coextensive with
the scope of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination”); Minnesota v. Murphy,
465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (“It has long been held that [the privilege against selfincrimination] not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal
trial at which he is a defendant, but also ’privileges him not to answer official questions put
to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings’ . . . ‘unless and until he is protected
at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom’”)
(quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1973)); Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459
U.S. 248, 256-57 (1983) (characterizing the “Fifth Amendment right” as a claim to silence
or immunity that exists at the time of questioning, in this case during a civil deposition);
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Even Michigan v. Tucker insisted that the ability to invoke the privilege
outside a criminal trial is a “right.”134
While the most striking aspect of the plurality’s analysis is its
wholesale revision of the immunity doctrine, worth noting as well is that
Justice Thomas also consigned Miranda to the prophylactic category. He
was hardly the first to do so, of course.135 But coming only three years after
Dickerson asserted Miranda’s constitutional status, the willingness of four
justices to downgrade it again is surprising and significant. If Miranda is
prophylactic in the sense that violations of Miranda do not violate the
Constitution, then the basis for applying Miranda to void a congressional
statute in Dickerson is elusive at best.136 Indeed, in the same Term it
decided Dickerson, the Court upheld a statutorydeparture from what it
called a prophylactic rule about briefing in potentially frivolous indigent
criminal appeals.137 If both rules are prophylactic in the sense of going
beyond what the Constitution requires, then the result should have been the
same – upholding the statute – in both cases.138
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) (describing the immunity
requirement as “the constitutional rule”); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431
(1956) (holding the Immunity Act of 1954 “protects a witness who is compelled to answer
to the extent of his constitutional immunity”); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586
(1892) (striking down the 1868 federal immunity statute in part because it did not “supply a
complete protection from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was
designed to guard, and [was] not a full substitute for that provision”). See also Kastigar,
406 U.S. at 449-55 (discussing Counselman, Ull mann, and Murphy).
134
417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974). See also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897)
(applying the privilege to suppress a statement made during police interrogation).
135
See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
136
Which was exactly Justice Scalia’s point in Dickerson. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 44546 (Scalia, J., dissenting). If, however, one believes that prophylactic rules have
constitutional status as interpretations and applications of the text, then striking down 18
U.S.C. § 3501 as inconsistent with Miranda was perfectly legitimate. See Strauss, supra
note 38.
137
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (limiting the scope of Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967)).
138
Indeed, one would expect the Court to be more likely to reject state deviation from a
prophylactic rule than federal deviation. Yet Dickerson struck down a federal deviation,
while Smith v. Robbins upheld a state deviation. If both rules are prophylactic, the only
possible explanation – besides politics – is that the Miranda rule, whether or not
prophylactic, is also constitutional, while the Anders rule is merely prophylactic.
Dickerson suggests such an explanation, but neither it nor Smith v. Robbins provides an
explanation of how we should sort this out, and the Chavez plurality seems to reject the
distinction entirely. For a helpful comparison of Dickerson and Smith, see Tracy A.
Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673,
756-59 (2001) [hereinafter Thomas, Remedial Rights].
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Lest readers think I have overstated the plurality’s position,
remember again what Justice Thomas did not say. He described the ability
to assert the privilege outside criminal proceedings, and the corresponding
entitlement to immunity, as a prophylactic “evidentiary privilege,” but he
never considered that it might be a rule of constitutional law. Second, he
never said clearly that the privilege applies as a matter of constitutional
right in all criminal proceedings. Third, Dickerson is entirely absent from
the opinion, and Miranda is once again a nonconstitutional, prophylactic
rule. Certainly, later cases will be able to ignore or distinguish the
reasoning of the plurality, but a fair reading of Justice Thomas’s opinion
makes plain that four justices agreed to a dramatic restatement of the
privilege against self-incrimination and that the other five justices were
splintered in their response.
IV. MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND PROPHYLACTIC RULES
Many commentators are comfortable, not merely with the idea of
prophylactic rules that protect constitutional rights by creating a buffer zone
of prohibited conduct beyond the scope of the actual right, but also with
prophylactic rules that go beyond core constitutional rights yetare
themselves enforceable as constitutional law.139 The Chavez plurality, by
contrast, articulated a more rigid dichotomy between constitutional law and
non-constitutional, minimally enforceable prophylactic rules subject to
congressional modification to the same extent as any other form of federal
common law.
The reason for the plurality’s insistence on a sharp divide, I believe,
is not just a general concern about the legitimacy of prophylactic rules, but
also an uncertainty about how to treat constitutional remedies. This
problem arises in two contexts. First, when the Court develops rules that
“safeguard” a core right – Miranda, of course, being the most notable
example – these rules can be seen as simply protective remedies and not
actual constitutional requirements. Second, whenever the Court discusses
139

See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 38; David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently:
Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV.
31, 56; Klein, Identifying, supra note 38; Schulhofer, Reconsidering, supra note 87, at 44851; Strauss, supra note 38; see also Caminker, supra note 130 (suggesting the word
“prophylactic” should be discarded but embracing the general approach to constitutional
law that prophylactic rules represent); Clymer, supra note 63 (appearing to be comfortable
with non-constitutional rules but less certain about their enforceability); Michael C. Dorf &
Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 73 n.47
(“Most of the academic literature accepts the legitimacy of prophylaxis, with the debate
focusing on how to justify it.”).
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the contours of a constitutional right, it must also consider how that right
will be applied and in particular how to remedy violations of that right.
It is tempting to think of remedies and rights as different things.
Evan Caminker suggests, for example, that “there is commonly some
slippage between rights and the doctrinal rules that enforce those rights.”140
Against this slippage, we might insist that the right remains inviolable – the
only true constitutional rule – even as courts under- or over-enforce it.141
Indeed, the concern that prophylactic rules over-enforce the Constitution
could be a critical factor for the justices in the Chavez plurality, who may
equate over-enforcement with undesirable judicial activism.
As constitutional scholars have begun to realize, however – and as
generations of private law scholars have recognized – rights and remedies
do not exist in separate, sealed environments. Remedies help define the
scope of a right. And if rights are things that have value, then surely a large
part of their value is the remedies that are available for violations of those
rights.142 Finally, not only does enforcement of a right require the crafting
of some remedy, but concerns about the appropriateness of various
remedies can shape the scope of a right.143 Justice Harlan’s Fifth

140

Caminker, supra note 130, at 28; see also Jeffries, Right-Remedy, supra note 28
(exploring and justifying gaps between rights and remedies in civil rights litigation).
141
See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (suggesting the Court underenforces
constitutional norms that should nonetheless be considered binding to their “full conceptual
boundaries”); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term – Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975) (suggesting some decisions –
including Miranda – go beyond what the Constitution requires and should be considered
constitutional common law subject to congressional modification or override).
142
As Susan Bandes put it, “By definition, a right must be enforceable. What would be the
measure of a right whose transgression carried no penalty? It would look more like a hope,
or a request, than a guarantee.” Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing
Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 306 (1995).
143
Daryl Levinson summarizes the point in this way:
Constitutional rights do not, in fact, emerge fully formed from abstract
interpretation of constitutional text, structure, and history, or from
philosophizing about constitutional values. The rights-essentialist
picture, in which courts begin with the pure, Platonic ideal of a
constitutional right and only then pragmatically apply the right through
the vehicles of implementation and remediation, bears little resemblance
to the actual judicial practice of rights-construction. . . . [C]onstitutional
rights are inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, remedial concerns.
Constitutional adjudication is functional not just at the level of remedies,
but all the way up. [In the structural reform context, moreover,] rights
and remedies are redefined in an iterated process that often stretches out
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Amendment dissents and Justice Souter’s opinion in Chavez seem to
recognize the validity of this point.
Both sides of this debate score important points. The “cash value”
of a right is critical to any realistic definition or understanding of its
meaning. Yet rights surely are more than the sum of their enforcement; the
articulation of constitutional norms beyond the context of available
remedies may modify behaviors and serve valuable civic, political, and
precedential purposes.144 So, too, the withholding or granting of remedies
can serve institutional and systemic goals that judges legitimately may
consider.145
Rights and remedies, then, are linked. When a court articulates and
applies a norm, the entire process gives meaning to the claimed right.146

over a number of years in an effort to achieve concrete changes in public
institutions.
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 873-74 (1999). David Cole concludes his discussion of “the inextricable relationship
between rights and remedies” with the following observation:
If right and remedy cannot easily be divided, then Congress’s “remedial”
measures are just as likely to affect the substantive scope of the right at
issue as the Court’s “substantive” interpretations are likely to determine
the remedies available. Thus, it may be impossible to draw the line the
Court asserts. If the remedial/substantive distinction cannot be
maintained in practice, the fact that it might be defended as a theoretical
matter is not of much significance.
Cole, supra note 139, at 67. Tracy Thomas is more concise: “Prophylactics are not rules;
they are remedies. A remedy is an intrinsic component of every legal ‘right.’” Tracy A.
Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v.
Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 363 (2002) [hereinafter Thomas, Looking Glass];
see also Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 138. For articles that laid the groundwork
for these claims, see Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal
Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735 (1992), and Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92
YALE L.J. 585 (1983).
144
See Levinson, supra note 143, at 905-11; cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Freedom from
Unreal Loyalties”: On Fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1773 (1997) (insisting the Constitution is legitimate only if held to its textual promise of
equal protection of the laws while also insisting the Constitution as it exists in practice
validates enormous amounts of inequality).
145
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term – Foreword: Implementing
the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 28, at 178791; Jeffries, Disaggregating, supra note 63, at 279-81.
146
See Levinson, supra note 143, at 857; Thomas, Looking Glass, supra note 143, at 371
(arguing “rights are comprised of two key components: the inert skeletal matter of the
substantive guarantee and the operative lifeblood of the remedy”). Evan Caminker seems
to make essentially the same point when he says,
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Moreover, the creation and assessment of remedies is a core judicial
function.147 And, as Susan Klein and David Strauss have powerfully
shown, prophylactic rules (and remedies) are an inescapable part of
constitutional adjudication.148 Finally, as Evan Caminker nicely explains
(using Miranda and the due process involuntary confession doctrine as his
examples), even if we could discern a correct constitutional norm, we could
never apply that rule in a way that would generate a precisely correct result
in every case.149 Nearly all constitutional interpretation consists of
approximations.
The crucial step is how to deal with these insights. We could vow to
do better in our efforts to interpret and apply a “real” but always elusive
Constitution. The better course, I think, is not to treat imprecision and
approximation as a loss. The Constitution is less a theoretical treatise than
it is a charter of government that we put into practice.150 That practice, in
turn, means not just the articulation of general norms but also the effort to
make those norms concrete. If putting the Constitution into practice
inevitably generates imprecision, we should accept that imprecision, at least
most of the time, as the real thing – that is, as the Constitution. Thus I
quibble with, for example, Richard Fallon’s statement that “the Court often
must craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but does not reflect
the Constitution’s meaning precisely.”151 If the meaning of the Constitution
is so elusive in individual cases that we cannot discern or apply it with any
precision, then we must consider the possibility – indeed, we must accept –
Judicial implementation of constitutional rights requires two major steps.
First, the Supreme Court must interpret the Constitution to identify the
constitutional norm relevant to resolving a given dispute. . . . The second
step is for the Supreme Court to translate further that conception of a
constitutional right or duty into a more specific and workable set of
doctrinal rules that can feasibly be applied to safeguard that right or
enforce that duty in specific cases.
Caminker, supra note 130, at 6-7 (emphasis added).
147
See Fallon, supra note 145, at 57 (“A crucial mission of the Court is to implement the
Constitution successfully.”). Indeed, a federal court lacks jurisdiction over a case if no
judicial remedy is available. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S.
83, 102-09 (1998); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 138, at 689-90.
148
See Klein, Identifying, supra note 38; Strauss, supra note 38; see also Dorf & Friedman,
supra note 139, at 76 n.60 (equating the issues surrounding prophylactic rules in
constitutional law with issues raised by constitutional remedies); Thomas, Looking Glass,
supra note 143, at 363 (“Prophylactics are not rules; they are remedies.”).
149
See Caminker, supra note 130, at 8-20, 26-27.
150
Cf. Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 1492
(1996) (emphasizing the idea that law is a practice in time).
151
Fallon, supra note 145, at 57.
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that the Constitution does not have a precise meaning. The tools we
develop to reach results in individual cases – including prophylactic rules –
do not serve simply to implement imperfectly a precise constitutional
meaning. Rather, these tools, together with the results of individual cases,
are the meaning of the Constitution.152 Once we are able to recognize the
Constitution thatwe have in practice, we will be in a better position to
achieve the Constitution that we theorize about.153
Several conclusions follow from these points. First, the rigid
distinction between constitutional rights and a lesser category of
prophylactic rules and remedies is insupportable. Second, prophylactic
rules and remedies have a constitutional dimension because of their role in
shaping constitutional meaning. Third, nearly all prophylactic rules are
constitutional law in the most meaningful sense of constraining government
conduct and providing remedies to injured individuals. Perhaps we can
conceive of two levels of prophylactics – constitutional prophylactics and
garden-variety prophylactics – but I do not know how we would tell the
difference between the two unless it turned on whether Congress may
change the rules in the second category but not in the first. Yet then one
category of prophylactic rules would be indistinguishable from the rest of
constitutional law. As I already have argued, I see little value in such a
distinction.154
152

Or at least a large part of constitutional meaning – as I have admitted, the articulation of
imprecise constitutional norms has value independent from the focus on concrete results.
At first blush, my claim seems similar to the Court’s statement in Cooper v. Aaron that its
interpretations of the Constitution are as much the supreme law of the land as the text of
the Constitution itself. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). The similarity holds to the extent the Court
meant to say that its interpretations of the Constitution are the Constitution. After all, the
text must be interpreted to be applied, and it acquires meaning only from the process of
interpretation. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988)
(arguing that legal indeterminacy reflects social plurality, with the result that constitutional
interpretation should be a dialogue of continuous renewal and revision). As will become
clear, however, I do not believe that this position leads to a conclusion of judicial
exclusivity in constitutional interpretation.
153
Thus, my position, while admittedly reductive, is not a “crude positivism” that makes
the remedy the only thing of importance. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015,
1055 (2004). Remedies reveal much of the real world value and meaning of rights, so
much so that we cannot talk about rights in any concrete way without taking remedies into
account. Sabel & Simon’s article provides an excellent example. Their recognition of the
importance of remedies and of remedial discretion leads them to reconceptualize the basic
rights claim of public law litigation as one of destabilization. See id. at 1055-56.
154
Indeed, some commentators come close to saying that all constitutional doctrine is
prophylactic in the sense that it seeks to implement an elusive or abstract constitutional
meaning. For example, Caminker demonstrates that the due process involuntary
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If rights, remedies, and prophylactic rules are all part of
constitutional meaning, then it also seems inevitable that Congress has a
role in defining what the Constitution means. Congress can modify the
remedies available for violations of constitutional rights.155 If remedies
help to define rights, then Congress also has some power to define
constitutional rights. Moreover, if the Constitution does not have a precise
meaning, courts have less room to claim exclusive authority over
constitutional interpretation because the existence of imprecision – even
after the courts rule – confirms that other outcomes would be equally
consistent with reasonable views of what the Constitution requires. Put
differently, imprecision suggests that, as an institutional matter, courts often
will not be able to provide precise interpretations of the Constitution and
may not even be able to provide the best interpretation in every case.156 If
so, then if Congress stays within the scope of reasonable disagreement
confession test is just as prophylactic as the Miranda warnings that have partly displaced it,
because “both are instrumental devices designed to safeguard constitutional values.”
Caminker, supra note 130, at 26-27. Describing doctrine in this way supports my point.
Few would suggest that Supreme Court constitutional interpretation is illegitimate simply
because the resulting doctrine is almost always prophylactic in this sense. Similarly, few
would contend that Congress may displace all constitutional doctrine because it is
prophylactic. Rather, because constitutional meaning is necessarily imprecise, there is
always a sense in which interpretation and doctrine are prophylactic by virtue of being
approximations, but these approximations are usually all we have of the Constitution in
practice.
155
Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(allowing damages action based on the Constitution), with Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296 (1983) (barring a Bivens claim in military context where statutory remedies were
arguably available); see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (upholding Prison Litigation
Reform Act‘s limitations on injunctive relief in litigation over the constitutionality of
prison conditions); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (holding the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act requires federal court deference to reasonable interpretations
of constitutional law by state courts); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
73-76 (1996) (holding Congress can create remedies that displace the action recognized in
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334
(1966) (holding Congress has broad discretion to fashion remedies for unconstitutional
uses of literacy tests as a prerequisite for voting).
156
For discussions of institutional constraints on constitutional interpretation by the Court
and Congress, see Cole, supra note 139, at 59-71, Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential NonEnforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 4043 (2000) (focusing on areas of relative executive advantage), Michael W. McConnell,
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV.
153 (1997), Sager, supra note 141, MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS 95-128 (1999). For the best recent statement in support of judicial
exclusivity in constitutional interpretation (or, at least, in support of giving the Courts the
exclusive last word on what is constitutional), see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,
On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
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created by the necessary imprecision of putting the Constitution into
practice, courts should hesitate before substituting their own views.157
Worth remembering here is that the Constitution has always meant
more than what the courts say it means.158 Congress has broad power to
interpret the Constitution in its daily practice of implementing the document
through legislation and other actions. The executive branch, too, has some
independent power to “say what the law is” and thus engages in
constitutional interpretation.159 Notwithstanding its periodic insistence on

157

For purposes of this article, I am relatively agnostic on whether the states also have this
power. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (allowing California to adopt a less
restrictive procedure than the one set out in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 38 (1967) for
determining whether an indigent’s criminal appeal is frivolous); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (inviting “Congress and the States” to develop alternative safeguards
for the privilege against self-incrimination) (emphasis added). Compare Michael C. Dorf,
The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60-69 (1998) (suggesting the
Supreme Court should engage in provisional adjudication that allows state experimentation
with constitutional doctrine); Dorf & Friedman, supra note 139, at 103-06 (suggesting state
legislatures should have the same power as Congress to craft protections for constitutional
rights that depart from the Miranda warnings but are adequate to protect Fifth Amendment
rights). My focus here is separation of powers. That said, there is a significant difference
between allocating the power to interpret the constitution within the federal government,
and sharing that power with the states. Although I am not concerned if states have some
power to change constitutional meaning – uniformity is not an overriding goal in general,
see Dorf, supra, at 65-67; Mark Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical
Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129
(1999); Mark V. Tushnet, Scalia and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Foolish
Formalism?, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1734 (1991) – at the end of the day we should
preserve overall federal supremacy in constitutional interpretation.
158
Also worth remembering is that the Court rarely stands fast against majoritarian views.
See Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347 (2003) (making
this point and collecting supporting materials); cf. Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003) (making a roughly
similar argument about aspects of the Court’s interaction with non-judicial actors); but see
Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, “Orderly
Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups”, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 503, 510 (2003) (suggesting statistics demonstrate the Court’s “increasing
aggressiveness . . . in reviewing federal statutes”). This point generates a potential
objection to my analysis: why do we need to give Congress a formal role in making
constitutional law when it usually gets what it wants anyway? At least a partial answer is
that Congress already has a formal role through the creation and modification of remedies,
and we need to confront this power seriously rather than maintain the pretense of judicial
exclusivity.
159
For discussions of coordinate branch authority to interpret the Constitution, see LOUIS
FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2001);
Johnsen, supra note 156; Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial
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judicial exclusivity, the Court, too, has accepted the authority of the
political branches to interpret the Constitution. For example, McCulloch v.
Maryland160 adopted a deferential view of Congress’s ability to interpret its
own powers – although recent cases have made clear that the Court intends
to police those limits to some degree.161 The tiers of equal protection
review similarly give state and federal legislatures room in most instances
to decide for themselves what actions are appropriate under the
Constitution, so long as they stay within the bounds of reasonableness.162
Consider, too, Nixon v. United States, in which the Court ruled that the
political question doctrine disabled it from hearing a claim that the Senate’s
interpretation of its power to “try all Impeachments” was
unconstitutional.163 As a result, the Senate’s interpretation of what the
Constitution requires in an impeachment trial is final and conclusive. 164
Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 924-25 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L. J. 217 (1994).
160
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
161
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). For a consistent discussion of
the Court’s history of deferring to Congress’s constitutional judgment, see Robert C. Post
& Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on
Section 5 Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 30-40 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Protecting].
162
This view of legislative activity finds particular resonance in Sager’s emphasis on the
institutional constraints that prevent federal courts from enforcing constitutional rights to
their full extent, with the result that legislatures are left with the responsibility to give effect
to constitutional norms. Where I differ from Sager is in describing the proper force of
these norms. For Sager, they represent the “full conceptual boundaries” of the
Constitution. See Sager, supra note 141, at 1213. To some extent, his claim is indisputable
– the Constitution can be read to support norms that go beyond existing doctrine. I would
argue, however, that these norms are at best arguments until a court or legislature turns
them into rights. Cf. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1606
(1986), reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT
COVER 203, 210 (Martha Minow, et al. eds., 1993) (“it is precisely this embedding of an
understanding of political text in institutional modes of action that distinguishes legal
interpretation from the interpretation of literature, from political philosophy, and from
constitutional criticism”).
163
506 U.S. 224 (1993) (refusing to decide the meaning of U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 3, cl. 6).
164
For an insightful discussion of the inverse correlation between the strength of the
political question doctrine and strong theories of judicial review, see Rachel E. Barkow,
More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of
Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002). Another example of this link comes
from Rebecca Brown’s criticism of Nixon for threatening the separation of powers (and
resulting protections of individual liberty) by undermining judicial review. See Rebecca L.
Brown, When Political Rights Affect Individual Rights, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125. The
alternative view of cases like Nixon, and of political questions generally, is that the Court
does not intervene because, in fact, there has been no violation of the Constitution. See
Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); see also
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Justice Jackson’s influential concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer also supports extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation.165 To assess the constitutionality of President Truman’s
seizure of the steel mills, Justice Jackson suggested three categories of
executive action. For the first category, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant
to an express or implied authorization of Congress,”166 he asserted that
executive action should be “supported by the strongest of presumptions and
the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”167 In other words, if Con gress
and the President agree that the President should have a particular power,
the Court rarely should intrude with a contrary view. The necessary result
of this inquiry is to leave the political branches with a presumptive last
word in most cases on the extent of presidential power, at least when they
agree.168
Finally, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments give Congress
the power to “enforce” their provisions “by appropriate legislation.”169 In
the Voting Rights Act, Congress used this power to prohibit state voting
practices that the Court had ruled were constitutional – that is, practices that
did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth amendments – thus raising the
Brown, supra, at 132 n.33, 153 n.106 (endorsing Henkin’s views). This approach, in other
words, requires us to wink at the Court’s purported reasoning and to substitute a “real”
interpretation that portrays the Court as engaged in judicial review rather than deference to
the constitutional interpretation of another branch. Although there is great value in figuring
out “what’s really going on” in Supreme Court decisions, that kind of analysis should not
distract us from also taking the Court’s articulated reasoning seriously on its own terms.
165
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
166
Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
167
Id. at 637.
168
The recognition of shared interpretive authority also emerges from Justice Jackson’s
second category, which encompasses cases in which “the President acts in absence of either
a congressional grant or denial of authority [and] can rely only on his own independent
powers.” Id. When reviewing this kind of action, “any actual test of power is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.” Id. If no clear legal rules govern situations like these, the
President frequently will have the last word on the constitutional scope of his or her power.
Justice Jackson’s analysis retains its influence. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 668 (1981) (redefining the categories as “point[s] along a spectrum” rather than “three
pigeonholes”); see also HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 140
(1990) (arguing Dames & Moore “inverted” Youngstown “by finding legislative ‘approval’
when Congress had given none”). Whether or not Jackson’s precise analysis is the law
today, he would have given Congress and the president the last word on executive power in
many instances, and Dames & Moore follows the same course.
169
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5, amend XV § 2; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 2
(same enforcement power).

Constitutional Interpretation and Coercive Interrogation

42

question of what, exactly, Congress was “enforcing.”170 In South Carolina
v. Katzenbach,171 Katzenbach v. Morgan,172 and City of Rome v. United
States,173 the Court nonetheless upheld the Act. In South Carolina, the
Court relied on the record compiled by Congress of racial discrimination in
the use of literacy tests – which turned a permissible practice into a
violation of the Constitution – and stressed Congress’s discretion in
choosing an appropriate remedy for this constitutional violation.174 In
Rome, the Court was careful to assert that Congress had merely created a
prophylactic remedy.175 In Morgan, however, the Court went further and
declared that Congress has an independent power to decide on its own what
constitutes a violation of equal protection, at least so long as it expands the
right.176
The Court’s more recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores177 can
be read to repudiate Morgan’s effort to share interpretive power with
Congress: Congress cannot “alter[] the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause” and has no “power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation.”178 Yet the Court admitted that Congress may prohibit states
from engaging in conduct permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress may go beyond the Constitution so long as there is “congruence
between the means used and the ends to be achieved” and the legislation is
not “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior.”179 The Court clearly meant to draw a line
170

Compare Voting Rights Act § 4, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (prohibiting use of literacy tests as a
prerequisite to enfranchisement), and Voting Rights Act § 5, 79 Stat. at 439 (prohibiting
voting practices that have the purpose or effect of “denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color), with Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding only
changes in voting practices made with the intent to discriminate violate the Constitution),
and Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (holding literacy tests as a
prerequisite to voting are constitutional).
171
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
172
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
173
446 U.S. 156 (1980).
174
383 U.S. at 333-34.
175
446 U.S. at 177.
176
384 U.S at 651 n.10, 653-56.
177
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
178
Id. at 519. See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (questioning Morgan’s
reasoning).
179
Id. at 530, 532. As the Court said in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81
(2000), “Congress’ power ‘to enforce’ the Amendment includes the authority both to
remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat
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between the power to declare constitutional law and the power to enforce or
remedy it. But if remedies are part of the definition of rights, what the
Court actually said is that Congress can’t go too far in its own
interpretations of the Constitution.180
The exactscope of Congress’s power to alter remedies remains
doctrinally unclear, as Boerne and its progeny – including Dickerson –
demonstrate.181 This lack of clarity reflects, in part, the Court’s struggle to
balance the undeniable remedial authority of Congress against the perceived
need to limit that power to ensure that Congress cannot use remedies to
reinterpret the Constitution. Yet some of this uncertainty may also reflect a
suspicion that the camel’s nose is already inside the tent: the ability under
Boerne to craft remedies to deter constitutional violations necessarily
includes the power to alter the shape of the Constitution in practice.
As a test, Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality” standard
provides a reasonable approach to defining the scope of Congressional
power to interpret the Constitution,182 so long as we are careful about
defining the reference points for thismeans -ends test.183 If constitutional
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s
text.” The Court described such legislation as “prophylactic.” Id.; see Nevada Department
of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977 (2003) (same).
180
Compare McConnell, supra note 156, at 184 (arguing legislation is valid under § 5 if it
is “within a reasonable range of plausible interpretations”); Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison
and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 459-73 (2000) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Equal] (arguing
the better interpretation of Boerne, as applied in Kimel, is that § 5 allows Congress to
remedy or deter “conduct that would violate the Equal Protection Clause” and forbids
legislation that is “constitutionally unreasonable or [tends] toward a substantive account of
the Equal Protection Clause that the Court wishes to suppress”). Worth noting here is that
the Court would retain its Marbury power to “say what the law is” because it would have
the last word on whether Congress went too far. See Post & Siegel, Equal, supra, at 472.
181
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. Compare
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (using Boerne to uphold gender discrimination damages claim
against states), with Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (using Boerne to
invalidate disability discrimination damages claim against states); Kimel, 528 U.S. 62
(using Boerne to invalidate age discrimination damages claim against states); Florida
Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (using
Boerne to invalidate patent infringement damages claim against states).
182
See Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 138, at 733-39 (endorsing the test in general);
Marci C. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469 (1999) (same).
183
See Dorf & Friedman, supra note 139, at 90-94 (appearing to approve of the congruence
and proportionality test so long as it is not too strict); Post & Siegel, Equal, supra note 180,
at 462 (warning against “the tendency to allow the Boerne test to slide into a kind of
narrow tailoring”).
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interpretation is inevitably imprecise, the Court should not require too close
a fit between its interpretation of the Constitution and the interpretation
reflected in congressional legislation that modifies remedies. Put
differently, the Court should recognize the imprecision of constitutional
interpretation and the role that shifting ideas of appropriate remedies play in
fixing constitutional meaning, as well as institutional issues that may vary
depending on the constitutional provisions at issue. As a consequence,
Congress should have real leeway to modify the perimeter of constitutional
rights by altering the available remedies.184
As Barry Friedman has suggested, the best way to manage
imprecision and the accompanying uncertainty about the scope of
Congress’s role is through an ongoing dialogue between the branches.185
Such a dialogue could create a rough sense of the core and perimeter of
various constitutional doctrines and implicates a variety of questions and
concerns. In light of my concern with the role of remedies in defining
constitutional interpretation, part of this effort might include the following
questions: what remedies are available for violation of a constitutional
right, and what purposes do those remedies serve?
The second question helps define the core of the constitutional right.
If we give a remedy with a particular purpose in mind, then the scope of the
right should encompass at least that purpose. The answer to the question, of
course, will rarely be clear. For example, we generally exclude statements
obtained in violation of Miranda, but we still must determine whether the
184

See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 961 (3d ed. 2000)
(suggesting “it may not make much sense to speak of the meaning of a given constitutional
provision; one may instead have to talk of a set of plausible meanings, with a different
subset corresponding to each of the key legal institutions empowered to ascribe meaning to
the provision for purposes peculiar to that institution’s work”). Importantly, this approach
gives Congress room to expand or contract rights under Section 5. That is to say, there is
no one-way ratchet in favor of expanding or contracting rights, although institutional
concerns could be invoked to limit the power of Congress to contract rights in certain
contexts. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (suggesting Congress
can expand but not contract rights at the margins of constitutional doctrine). Compare
Cole, supra note 139, at 69-71 (endorsing a version of the “ratchet” theory), and Dorf &
Friedman, supra note 139, at 90 (arguing Boerne allows a one-way “remedial ratchet”),
with TRIBE, supra, at 946 (arguing the one-way ratchet ignores the fact that, “[w]hichever
way Congress turns, it may be increasing the protection afforded to one constitutionally
recognized right, value, or interest while at the same time decreasing that afforded to
another”).
185
See Friedman, supra note 143; Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91
MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993); see also Post & Siegel, Equal, supra note 180, at 513-22
(discussing the interaction of Court and Congress in the shaping of equal protection law
and jurisprudence); Post & Siegel, Protecting, supra note 161, at 25.
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core right is to be free from compulsion, to remain silent, or something else.
The first question also affects the scope of the right but leaves more room
for contrary legislative judgment about the efficacy and desirability of
various remedies. Whether we label it prophylactic, or constitutional
common law, or perhaps just quasi-constitutional, some level of remedy is
constitutionally necessary in most cases, even though the exact scope of
remedy is something that Congress may address.186
In sum, prophylactic rules are a legitimate part of constitutional law,
and in the vast majority of circumstances they are no different from other
constitutional doctrines. For that reason, we should consider abandoning
the term “prophylactic” and the very idea that certain kinds of constitutional
rules are different from and perhaps less legitimate than others because of
their scope. Constitutional interpretation by Court, Congress, or President
does not give us the Constitution, more or less.187 It gives us all the
Constitution we have. Yet the fact that doctrines formerly known as
prophylactic are now simply constitutional does not insulate them
from
congressional interference. Through the process of modifying remedies,
Congress can alter the definition of constitutional rights so long asit does
not go too far.
V. THE CONSTITUTION AND COERCIVE INTERROGATION
A. Redescribing the Fifth Amendment Privilege
As the preceding discussion should suggest, there is no obviously
precise or proper interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
At best, we can struggle to define a core and shifting periphery of doctrine.
Clearly within the core is a narrow trial right: the ban on forcing a person to
testify against herself at her criminal trial. A slightly broader reading of the
text would include testimony by any person at a criminal trial, before a
grand jury, or at a preliminary hearing.188 The rest of this section starts
from a remedial perspective to confirm and expand this broader view of the
186

See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 28, at 1778-87 (noting the Constitution does not
require a remedy for every violation of a right, so long as remedies are available in most
cases). I quarrel with this point only to the extent that I doubt the value in many
circumstances of calling something a right in the absence of a remedy. Worth noting here
is that although I object to the term “prophylactic,” it could survive as a way to mark out
the areas of constitutional doctrine over which Congress (and perhaps the states) shares
interpretive authority. For a discussion of core vs. prophylactic rights that emphasizes the
possibilities this distinction creates for experimentation, see Dorf, supra note 157, at 70-73.
187
See Monaghan, supra note 141 (suggesting the Court sometimes gives us more than the
Constitution, in the form of constitutional common law); Sager, supra note 141(suggesting
the Court sometimes gives us less than the Constitution, in the form of underenforced
norms).
188
See Friendly, supra note 85, at 676.
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core. To some extent, this section makes a descriptive claim – thattext and
history, with the assistance of the remedial perspective, tell us what the
current scope of the privilege really is. But my goals are critical and
prescriptive as well. I seek to justify a fairly expansive core doctrine even
as I admit the limits of my arguments, and I ultimately concede an area of
shared interpretation between Court and Congress.189
1. Learning from Immunity
The Supreme Court has developed two remedies for people from
whom incriminating statements have been compelled in a custodial or
formal setting but outside a criminal trial. The first is narrow and close to
the text: the compelled statement is excluded from evidence at a subsequent
criminal trial. The second is broader: the person from whom the statement
was taken receives immunity from the use or derivative use of that
statement in a subsequent criminal investigation or prosecution.190 Initially,
therefore, the privilege against self-incrimination is more than a right not to
be called to testify at trial; it also takes account of conduct outside the
trial.191 Although the exclusionary remedy clearly suggests a trial right, the
broad remedy of use and derivative-use immunitysu ggests something more.
To some extent, immunity can be described as ultimately about the
trial as well. Under Kastigar, a grant of immunity allows the government to
compel testimony and use it against other people (most obviously at trial)
and protects the person who gave the testimony from having compelled
information used against her (again, most obviously at trial).192 Yet this
189

Cf. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 28, at 1737-38 (suggesting constitutional doctrine
should be normatively attractive and descriptively accurate). I take incorporation of the
privilege for granted throughout my discussion. Compare Dripps, Against, supra note 85
(suggesting the Supreme Court should “disincorporate” the privilege).
190
See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2002 (plurality opinion).
191
Here I should note a third remedy or protection associated with the privilege: the
protection against comment by the prosecution on one’s express or implied assertion of the
privilege. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). This particular remedy or
protection supports a trial right interpretation of the privilege, but it is also a key precedent
for a broader constitutional right to remain silent. In other words, it can also be described
as a trial remedy that protects a broader right.
192
See Clymer, supra note 63, at 465-66 (making this point). The same objection and
response can be made about the cases involving restrictions on use by state actors of
economic threats to compel incriminating statements. See id. at 467-72 (making the
objection). Similarly, Mark Godsey relies on Kastigar to support the trial right theory of
self-incrimination. He claims the Court “made clear that the ‘sole concern’ of the privilege
was not the forcible extraction of statements; rather the privilege only prohibits such
statements from being introduced at trial or similar proceeding to inflict criminal penalties
upon the person who was ‘compelled’ to speak.” Godsey, supra note 55, at 877 (quoting
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453). Yet Godsey quotes the Court out of context. In the course of
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description wrongly ignores the fact that the immunity remedy also
provides a real, enforceable protection against compelled incrimination
outside the courtroom. Absent a grant of immunity, again as per Kastigar,
the Constitution forbids compelling a person to incriminate herself in a
variety of formal and custodial settings.193 In short, following Michigan v.
Tucker and Minnesota v. Murphy, the privilege is, first, a trial right not to
have compelled statements used against one and, second, a broader right not
to have statements compelled by state actors where those statements might
be used against the speaker in a criminal trial. The immunity remedy means
that, contrary to the claims of some commentators, compulsion of testimony
outside the courtroom – without more – violates the privilege.
While I think this analysis supports a fairly broad scope for the
privilege, one could still reasonably insist that the real focus of the right
remains the criminal trial, and that the remedies developed by the Court are
simply powerful methods of protecting the witness from testifying against
herself in any meaningful way, whether directly or indirectly.194 To the
extent that objection has force, the immunity remedy is broader than the
underlying right, and we ought to be concerned about its legitimacy as
inviolable constitutional law. Justice Thomas resolved this concern by
simply classifying immunity as a prophylactic rule presumably subject to
congressional override. Based on the assumption that the privilege is only a
trial right, he has the better of the argument – Congress can modify or reject
the immunity remedy. And once we accept this analysis for immunity, its
application to Miranda follows a fortiori. Yet we need not go so far with
explaining that the Constitution requires only use and derivative-use immunity, the Court
said:
The privilege has never been construed to mean that one who invokes it
cannot subsequently be prosecuted. Its sole concern is to afford protection
against being “forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of
‘penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.’” Immunity from the use of
compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly
therefrom, affords this protection.
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (citations omitted). Nothing in this statement declares the
privilege to be only a trial right. To the contrary, the entire thrust of the Court’s analysis –
that immunity must be coextensive with the privilege, both of which apply outside the trial
(as used by the Court, the word “testimony” clearly means more than trial testimony) –
undermines Godsey’s claim.
193
Obviously, if the view of the dissenters in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), had
prevailed, immunity would rarely if ever be an option, and the privilege would be far
stronger and plainly more than a trial right. But the rejection of their position and the
resulting allowance of immunity does not mean that the privilege is only a trial right. It is
weaker outside the courtroom than it could have been, but it still has force.
194
See, e.g., Clymer, supra note 63, at 459-78.
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Justice Thomas. The best course is to recognize what the remedies tell us:
the core right itself goes beyond the trial. While Congress has a role in
defining the right by modifying the remedies available for violations of the
privilege, it would go too far were it to adopt remedies that define the
privilege as only a trial right.
2. Justifying a Broad Privilege
The remedial perspective helps describe the actual scope of the right
protected by the privilege but does not by itself justify that scope. Attacks
on the privilege, most notably by David Dolinko and Judge Henry Friendly,
undermine many of the policy arguments that the Court employed in
Murphy.195 Yet several arguments remainavailable to buttress a broad
195

See Dolinko, supra note 89; Friendly, supra note 85. While Dolinko’s analysis is
impressive and convincing, he overplays his hand in a few instances. First, and most
important, the privilege can protect innocent defendants. Compare infra notes 219-29 and
accompanying text, with Dolinko, supra note 89, at 1074-77, andDripps, Against, supra
note 85, at 715-16 (expanding on Dolinko’s point to argue the privilege will never protect
innocent defendants but might cause their conviction by denying them exculpatory
evidence). Second, Dolinko suggests the privilege cannot be justified on the ground that it
makes the trial more of an equal contest, because if we really wanted to achieve this goal,
we would “enabl[e] the defendant to develop and present any facts or legal arguments that
could establish his innocence.” Dolinko, supra note 89, at 1076-77. Surely this is an
example of the best being the enemy of the good. True, we could increase the funds
available for indigent criminal defense, which would allow greater development of
evidence and arguments and better serve the equalization goal than merely allowing the
privilege. But if legislatures do not approve the large expense necessary to equalize
criminal trials by giving more tools to the defense, then denying tools to the prosecution
may be the only reasonable way to achieve this goal. Dolinko then dismisses the claim that
incriminating statements should be excluded because they are unreliable, on the ground
that “other unreliable sorts of evidence are routinely admitted at trial. Id. at 1077 n.76. Yet
by the logic of his equalization argument, he ought to have argued for excluding all
unreliable evidence. Third, Dolinko claims the privilege undermines popular esteem for
the criminal justice system. Id. at 1088-89. To some extent, Justice Kennedy addressed
this issue in Chavez. See 123 S. Ct. at 2015 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). More generally, Dolinko conveniently ignores the social meaning of Miranda.
The Court’s decision in Dickerson suggests an appreciation for the fact that the privilege is
seen – rightly or wrongly – as a cornerstone of the criminal justice system, particularly at
the investigative stage. See also Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2664. Finally, Dolinko
contends privacy arguments for the privilege fail, in part because by their logic the
privilege should apply any time an incriminating statement would result in adverse
consequences from the state, criminal or otherwise. Dolinko, supra note 89, at 1114-15.
This claim seems ahistorical. At the time the privilege developed, there was no welldeveloped regulatory state with a general practice of imposing civil penalties for noncompliance with law. In that context, the privacy rationale for a privilege only in criminal
proceedings is more forceful. In the present context, Dolinko’s objection suggests the
privacy rationale eroded as times changed, but one could just as easily use his objection as
support for extending the privilege to non-criminal proceedings, at least when penalties are
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privilege at trial and beyond.
The first argument draws from the text. Whatever our individual
views of the privilege, the text of the Constitution clearly creates at least a
criminal trial right. As I already have noted, moreover, the most convincing
textual interpretations support the cases that have applied the privilege to
other proceedings in addition to the trial. The logic of the text, in other
words, supports a broader privilege, and we should accept that logic as a
matter of constitutional principle. Even the approach to constitutional
interpretation that I outlined earlier in this article would not allow us to
“pick and choose which of its provisions we are willing to obey” or to
“constru[e] the privilege to death because we think its basic policy is
mistaken.”196 In short, we must accept the criminal trial right, and once we
do so, we must also read the text fairly to include other proceedings, too197
The second argument is historical. As best we can recapture the
original understanding, the privilege was intended to prohibit “(1)
incriminating interrogation under oath, (2) torture, and (3) probably other
forms of coercive interrogation such as threats of future punishment and
promises of leniency.”198 That is, as Albert Alschuler concludes, the
privilege centered less on a right to remain silent at trial and more on
“improper methods of gaining information from criminal suspects.”199 In
addition, Eben Moglen has argued that constitutionalization of the privilege
emerged from revolutionary concerns about maintaining liberty and
autonomy against despotic governments. The privilege was part of a
package of rights linked to the “function of the jury trial in limiting
governmental power.”200 During ratification, anti-federalists transferred
severe enough. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2647 n.83 (noting the Fifth Amendment
privilege is narrower that the nemo tenetur maxim in one respect: “the older maxim could
be invoked successfully when there was no risk of criminal punishment but merely a risk of
civil liability or of injury to reputation”).
196
See Dripps, Against, supra note 85, at 723-24.
197
See id. at 724; Friendly, supra note 85, at 676.
198
Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2651.
199
Id. at 2652.
200
See Moglen, supra note 86, at 1087; see also id. at 1114-18. Although her focus is more
general and does not explicitly touch on criminal procedure, Joyce Appleby compliments
Moglen’s argument in her discussion of how liberal ideas became an important part of
revolutionary ideology. She contends that beginning in the 1740s and 50s, colonial society
became more atomized and less interdependent.
For a large number of men coming of age in the 1740s and 1750s the
contrasting statuses of free and unfree, dependent and independent, came
to represent stark alternatives. . . . This new social situation made
contemporaries peculiarly sensitive to threats against their personal
freedom. Among the many satisfying human goals, liberty came to
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this concern about tyranny to the federal government, and they insisted on a
bill of rights that would include protection against “the potentially
oppressive use of the criminal justice system by the new federal
government.”201
The concern about tyranny seems excessive, not only from our
perspective but also from that of others in the founding generation.
Moreover, by itself, this concern does not require a broad privilege against
self-incrimination because the due process clauses and the First Amendment
could handle much of this work if there were no privilege.202 From an
originalist perspective, of course, that argument fails – the privilege was
understood to restrict improper methods of obtaining information from
suspects, and so it should be interpreted (but perhaps with some concerns

overshadow all others. This changing balance between the demands of
the community and the individual helps explain two puzzling American
developments in the revolutionary era: why the colonists reacted with
such frenzied apprehensiveness to Parliamentary efforts to enforce
imperial controls, and why liberalism with its core affirmation of the
individual’s claim upon society to protect his natural rights could so
easily have displaced the devotion to order which animated colonial life a
half-century earlier.
JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 144
(1992).
201
Moglen, supra note 86, at 1122. As Moglen explains more fully, four states proposed
complete bills of rights that included language to constitutionalize the privilege, and he
finds some evidence in the ratification debates to link these proposals with concerns about
liberty and despotism. See also SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, at 31 (1999) (highlighting
the anti-federalist desire for a bill of rights to preserve “essential personal liberties retained
by the people [including] trial by jury”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 536-43 (1969) (discussing the antifederalist desire for a bill
of rights to preserve liberty). Moglen and Alschuler disagree slightly on how the privilege
operated in the early republic. Moglen focuses on the role of section 8 of George Mason’s
Virginia Declaration of Rights, which said an accused cannot “be compelled to give
evidence against himself,” as a forerunner of the privilege. Moglen, supra note 86, at 1118
(quoting the Declaration). He construes this language to include a right to silence that
functioned as a symbolic statement about the limits of state power but was not observed in
ordinary criminal trials. Id. at 1126-27. Alschuler focuses on the idea of the privilege as a
constraint on government conduct, not a right to be silent at trial, and he contends the
broader right to remain silent emerged in the nineteenth century. See Alschuler, supra note
86, at 2656-57. Both agree, in other words, that a right to remain silent in criminal trials
became generally accepted only after adoption of the privilege.
202
See Dolinko, supra note 89, at 1079-80, 1085-87; Dripps, Against, supra note 85, at
713, 716-17, 731.
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about incorporation).203 In any event, history has more to say about the
privilege.
If a right to remain silent was not established as part of the privilege
or was uncertain at the founding, it certainly emerged in state and federal
law during the nineteenth century, most strongly out of the decision to allow
defendants to give sworn testimony. To protect defendants and satisfy
constitutional concerns, the ability to testify under oath usually was linked
to a prohibition against commenting on the silence of a defendant who
chose not to testify.204 Much later, in Griffin v. California,205 the Supreme
Court ratified these concerns by holding that the Constitution forbids
comment on the defendant’s refusal to testify, thus cementing at least a
limited right to silence one year beforeMiranda.
In the late nineteenth century, moreover, the Supreme Court –
influenced by libertarian ideas associated with the Republican party and
classical legal thought – strengthened and expanded the constitutional
privilege in a series of cases that interpreted it as more than a trial right.206
203

Cf. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-56 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(suggesting the original understanding of the privilege could require protection for
incriminating documents similar to what the Court recognized in Boyd but later backed
away from). Compare Justice Scalia’s argument in Burnham v. Superior Court, that what
counts is what the founding (or amending) generation understood, even if that
understanding was incorrect as a factual matter. See 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990) (plurality
opinion). By extension, even if the founding generation chose cumbersome methods or
reacted to over-inflated concerns, what counts is what they thought and did.
204
See Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2660-63. For a history of the constraints on testimony
by criminal defendants and the move to allowing defendants to testify under oath in
England and the United States, see George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as a Lie Detector, 107
YALE L.J. 575 (1997).
205
380 U.S. 609 (1965); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 (1964) (referring
to a suspect’s “absolute right to remain silent” during interrogation).
206
See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). For discussion of the late nineteenth
century Court’s insistence on the primacy of liberty, see OWEN M. FISS, VIII HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN
STATE, 1888-1910, at 19-20, 45-46, 389-90 (1993) (highlighting the Fuller Court’s
emphasis on liberty); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF THE LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 6 (1993) (noting the links
between liberty of contract and anti-slavery and Republican ideals); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1728-31, 173740 (1976) (noting classical legal thought’s emphasis on individuality and free will); see
also Stephen A. Siegel, Let Us Now Praise Infamous Men, 73 TEX. L. REV. 661, 667-69,
686-87 (1995) (summarizing the scholarly consensus on the Fuller Court’s concern for
liberty); Stephen A. Siegel, The Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 631, 634-35
(2002) (same).
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Although these decisions may have been “excessive” in their portrayal of
the government “in the role of a despotic power,”207 and the Court stepped
back from their implications in Twining v. New Jersey,208 they plainly
resonated with revolutionary and anti-federalist traditions thatsha ped the
original understanding of the privilege and still exist in American culture.209
One way of thinking about the late nineteenth century privilege
cases is to see them as exercises in translating the privilege from the context
of the founding era to the different circumstances of an emerging regulatory
state.210 That process continues today, mindful of tradition but also
cognizant of the pressures created by change.211 If the privilege reflects a
concern about state power over criminal suspects, then taking that concern
seriously may require a logical application of the privilege to a variety of
proceedings and circumstances, even if we reject some of the rhetoric in the
earlier cases.212 So, for example, if the Fuller Court’s concern about liberty
drove expansion of the privilege in the late nineteenth century, concerns
about police discretion and institutionalized racism may explain the Warren
Court cases.213 Today, as the ongoing war on crime expands into the war
on terror, concerns about liberty and police discretion – and a renewed
concern about physical coercion – support a continued broad privilege.214
This perspective, in brief, uses history and persisting ideological
207

CHARLES FAIRMAN, VII HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 741 (1987) (criticizing Boyd).
208
211 U.S. 78 (1908). But of course, Twining also comfortably asserted that jury trials are
not fundamental. See id. at 110-11. In other words, Twining set its face against, not just
the privilege, but against an entire “cluster” of rights that revolutionary theorists saw as
essential to restraining despotic power. See Moglen, supra note 86, at 1087.
209
Akhil Amar thus gets it half right when he classifies Boyd as a Lochner-era case. He
treats Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as a stand-in for an overweening and nowdisregarded emphasis on property rights, with the result that Boyd, too, is an aberration.
See AMAR, supra note 122, at 22-25. Amar is correct that Boyd and Lochner are kin, but
he misses their shared emphasis on a more general conception of liberty against a
potentially despotic government that goes beyond rights to property, and he ignores the
clear connection between these cases and aspects of the revolutionary tradition.
210
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
211
One could even use the problem of translation to help explain constitutional imprecision
and even to justify giving Congress a role in the creation of constitutional meaning.
212
Thus, the analogy between founding-era pretrial examination by a magistrate and
contemporary stationhouse interrogation has a firmer basis when seen as an issue of
translation. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
213
See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
GEO. L.J. 1153, 1155-59 (1998).
214
For contemporary proposals to control police discretion and safeguard liberty interests,
see Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000); Parry, Judicial
Restraints, supra note 6, at 122-38.
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commitments about constitutional liberty to rehabilitate to some extent the
privacy and autonomy rationales frequently derided by critics of the
privilege.
Bear in mind, however, that the process of translation is more
complicated, because it could result in narrowing the scope of the right
(unless translation operates as only a one-way ratchet, which seems
untenable). Even as I argue for a broad privilege, others could respond that
circumstances have made the privilege unnecessary in formal proceedings
and that the war on terror makes the liberty and discretion arguments swing
against the privilege, or they could make the less dramatic argument that the
development of due process doctrine has created a better way to address
these concerns.215 Also, of course, one could object that my translation
argument takes place at too high a level of generality (although it does draw
on specific discussions of the privilege).216 To my mind, the text provides
an adequate backstop against claims such as these, but the argument is
hardly ironclad.
Whatever their limits, the textual and historical arguments work
together to create a strong inference that the privilege must apply in the
stationhouse as well as the courtroom. Yale Kamisar’s famous comparison
between the “mansions and gatehouses” of criminal procedure – that is,
between the protective environment of the public criminal trial and the
concealed rooms of police interrogation – captures the argument.217 And no
one has distilled this point more forcefully than Stephen Saltz burg:
If the drafters of the fifth amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination intended that, as long as the possibility of
incrimination in a criminal case exists, no magistrate, judge
or court of the United States could compel a person to answer
questions – even though the person is given a lawyer, the
proceedings are public and recorded and scrupulously fair –
could they possibly have intended to permit other officials
(police and prosecutors) to compel the same answers in secret
sessions, most often unrecorded, without the suspect having
counsel, and with no judicial protection against the nature
215

See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the original
purposes of the privilege no longer support it).
216
In the end, this exercise lends support to Michael Klarman’s claim that translation is
indeterminate and tends simply to confirm the views of the person employing it. See
Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 394-412 (1997).
217
YALE KAMISAR, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 2740 (1980).
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and manner of questioning? Such an honest question
deserves an honest answer; the answer is Miranda.218
One might even argue that, once we follow the logic of the privilege to
include other proceedings, the burden of persuasion should rest on those
who oppose applying it to police interrogation.
Stephen Schulhofer has provided a third argument for the privilege
that I find more compelling than the first two because it homes in on the
issue of reliability. Schulhofer contends that “the privilege helps many
innocent defendants and that acquitting these innocents is more important
than convicting an equal or somewhat larger number of guilty
defendants.”219 Rather than rely on theoretical or historical claims,
Schulhofer grounds his argument in a fundamental decision facing any
attorney who represents an innocent defendant:
Can you think of any reason why might not put your client on
the stand if you have the choice? Of course you can. Every
lawyer can. Your client might have a highly prejudicial prior
record that will become admissible once he takes the stand.
There are likely to be suspicious transactions or associations
that your innocent client will have to explain. But he may
look sleazy. He may be inarticulate, nervous, or easily
intimidated. His vague memory on some of the details may
leave him vulnerable to clever cross-examination. Most
ordinary citizens find that being a witness in any formal
proceeding is stressful and confusing. The problems are
bound to be heightened when the witness happens to be on
trial for his life or his liberty. Some people can handle this
kind of situation, but others, especially if they are poor,
poorly educated or inarticulate, cannot. They may handle the
experience poorly whether or not they are guilty.220
218

Stephen A. Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial
Fiat, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 14 (1986); see also Dripps, Against, supra note 85, at 724-25 &
n.97 (agreeing with Saltzburg). In light of more recent historical research, one could
quibble with Saltzburg’s assertion of exactly what the founding generation understood the
privilege to mean, but his basic point remains sound.
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Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination,
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 329 (1991) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Kind Words]. Schulhofer
provides statistics that support an inference in his favor: 23% of felony defendants and
34% of misdemeanor defendants who invoked the privilege in Philadelphia in the early
1980s were acquitted. See id. at 329-30. These numbers do not mean that the acquitted
defendants were innocent, but one hopes that the fact of acquittal – especially when the
defendant did not take the stand and deny the charges – means that many of them were.
220
Id. at 330.
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In other words, Schulhofer’s argument fills out the Court’s brief reasoning
in Griffin v. California supporting the holding that the Fifth Amendment
bars comment on a defendant’s silence.221 This reasoning, in turn,
buttresses the claim in Murphy that the privilege, “while sometimes ‘a
shelter to the guilty,’ is often a protection to the innocent.”222 So, too,
Schulhofer‘s words resonate with the Court’s more amorphous concern in
Brown about “press[ing],” “browbeat[ing],” and “entrap[ping]”
defendants.223
Nor can this logic be confined to trial testimony. The same concerns
support the Court’s application of the privilege to other formal proceedings
at which defendants or other witnesses must choose whether to testify.224 In
other words, application of the privilege in these contexts has an affirmative
policy justification that goes beyond text and history and is independent of
the more familiar rationale of protecting the trial right.225
Finally, Schulhofer’s rationale also applies to police interrogation.
Even critics of the privilege usually admit – as the Court held in Miranda –
that compulsion is inherent in stationhouse interrogation, although they
often prefer unrealistic alternatives to the privilege, such as judicially
supervised questioning of suspects.226 Not only is compulsion inherent to
interrogation, but well-trained police interrogators are able to manipulate a
suspect through a variety of techniques, including threats and deception.227
And these techniques are not practiced only on the guilty. In addition to
those who are acquitted at trial, many of those arrested, held, and
interrogated are never charged with a crime. In other words, large numbers
of suspects who endure the inherent and often actual compulsion of
221

380 U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965).
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
223
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896).
224
See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) (listing proceedings at which the
privilege is available to witnesses).
225
See id. at 440-41 (contending the broad scope of the privilege is necessary to protect the
trial right); Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1341.
226
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966); Alschuler, supra note 86; AMAR,
supra note 122, at 65-68; Dripps, Against, supra note 85; Friendly, supra note 85, at 712.
Others urge reliance on the due process clauses to constrain abusive police interrogation.
See Clymer, supra note 63, at 472-78; Dolinko, supra note 89, at 1079-80; Joseph D.
Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 896-909
(1979). See also KAMISAR, supra note 217, at 37 (discussing claims that compulsion as a
constitutional concept does not apply to police interrogation). Compare Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 448-50 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (appearing to argue
much interrogation is not coercive).
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See Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1233-46 (2001).
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interrogation are innocent.228 That fact gives real weight to concerns about
individual dignity and autonomy. More important, that fact should make it
no surprise that “in a small but significant number of cases, widely
employed interrogation practices create a significant risk of false
confessions that, in turn, leads to an unacceptable risk of wrongful
convictions resulting from such confessions.”229 In short, the text does not
forbid extending the privilege to police interrogation, history supports it,
and the reliability concern about convicting innocent defendants applies
here with as much force as in the courtroom. In addition, a liberty or
dignity concern about subjecting innocent suspects to the compulsion
inherent in interrogation even if they never give a false confession provides
further support for applying the privilege to custodial situations.
What, then, of Miranda’s controversial holding that the Fifth
Amendment not only applies to police interrogation but also requires police
to warn suspects of their rights?230 The Miranda remedy excludes
statements even when a defendant cannot present individualized proof of
compulsion and made no effort to invoke the privilege during the
interrogation. Failure to give the Miranda warnings itself generates the
remedy unless one of the exceptions to Miranda applies. A fair assessment
of this remedy could support a broad right to remain silent.231
Alternatively, Miranda might simply stand for the right to be advised of and
allowed to assert one’s rights in a custodial setting.232 Critically, under
almost any construction, the remedy that Miranda provides compels the
conclusion that the decision broadens the scope of the Fifth Amendment,
although subsequent cases limited the remedy and thereby reined in the
right.233 Indeed, it is precisely because Miranda sought to expand the scope
228

See KAMISAR, supra note 217, at 36 (citing statistics from the 1950s and 60s); Klein,
Deconstitutionalized, supra note 55, at 462 (citing statistics from the 1980s). If as many as
50% of those arrested are never convicted of a crime, see id., then inherently coercive
interrogation is practiced on large numbers of the innocent as well as on the guilty.
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WHITE, supra note 38, at 139; see also White, supra note 227, at 1224-29.
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461, 467-74 (1966).
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See Michael Avery, You Have a Right to Remain Silent, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 571,
583-87 (2003).
232
See Dorf & Friedman, supra note 139, at 63-64, 78; compare George C. Thomas III,
Separated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2001) (arguing Miranda should be seen today as basically a notice
case), with Susan R. Klein, Miranda’s Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIM. 567 (2001) (arguing Miranda should continue to be understood as a
prophylactic self-incrimination case).
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See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1985) (allowing admission of
defendant’s statement given after warnings even though defendant had already been
interrogated in violation of Miranda); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)
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of the Fifth Amendment that the Court called it prophylactic in the later
cases as a way of retreating from the full implications of the decision.
The point I want to make, of course, is not only that a broad
definition of the right in Miranda compels a broad remedy but also that the
broad remedy provided by Miranda compels a broader definition of the
right, while a narrower definition of the right necessarily creates more room
for congressional modification of the remedy. So, if the focus of the
privilege is actual, compelled incrimination under circumstances that go
beyond some assumed baseline of normal interrogation, then the Miranda
remedy, premised on a presumption of inherent compulsion in custodial
settings, seems quite broad, and Congress should have room to tinker with it
– perhaps even to the extent of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which the Court struck
down in Dickerson. If, on the other hand, the right encompasses more than
protection against actual compulsion, then the Miranda remedy is a tighter
fit and Congress has less room to maneuver.
Miranda’s additional holding that suspects can waive their right to
remain silent234 – even though waiver takes place in the same problematic
atmosphere of interrogation – is central to inter preting the right that the
Court created. The availability of waiver – effectively a limit on the remedy
created by the warnings – allows a reading of Miranda that deemphasizes
the rights to remain silent and to be free in general of the compulsion
inherent in interrogation. With waiver, the Court concluded police
interrogation is constitutionally permissible despitethe fact that compulsion
is inherent in it, and it may even have believed that some compulsion is
desirable.235 Miranda thus implements, perhaps imperfectly, a broad
conception of fairness in criminal investigation – a better atmosphere for
suspects but without hamstringing legitimate police attempts to solve
crimes. To that end, the Court expanded the privilege against selfincrimination to include a substantive right to be free of some but not all of
(allowing a public safety exception to Miranda); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444
(1974) (allowing use of the fruits of an interrogation that violates Miranda); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing use for impeachment of statements taken in violation
of Miranda); Levinson, supra note 143, at 909-10.
234
See 384 U.S. at 475.
235
Thus, the Court implicitly rejected the alternative of examination by or in the presence
of a magistrate. The Court also stepped back from holding that police interrogation must
take place in the presence of counsel, which could have followed from Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964). See Klein, Deconstitutionalized, supra note 55, at 423 (“at the time
Escobedo v. Illinois was decided, many commentators feared that its sweeping language
regarding the need for counsel before confessions are taken and its attack on the use of
confessions in general presaged the development of a new rule that would bar both
uncounseled confessions and volunteered statements”).
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the compulsion inherent in interrogation.236 Put another way, the Miranda
warnings can be seen as intended to dispel enough compulsion to allow a
suspect to reflect on whether to talk or remain silent.237
But because the remedy provided by Miranda turns on a
presumption of compulsion, it will apply regardless of the actual amount of
compulsion felt by each individual. In some cases – perhaps particularly
those involving hardened or experienced criminals – the amount of
compulsion arising out of the fact of interrogation alone will not be
significant. Suspects in these cases will be fully capable of reflecting on
whether to talk or remain silent even if no warnings are given. The certain
existence of such cases could tempt Congress to craft a more precise
remedy that accomplishes the goal of reducing compulsion.238
Section 3501, which essentially sought to overrule Miranda and
reassert the totality of the circumstances test as the only standard for
assessing custodial interrogation, was plainly inadequate.239 Yet if we
accept that Congress has some power to define the right in the course of
modifying the remedy, then it need not go as far as Miranda.240 Assume,
for example, that Congress decides the remedy of exclusion should be
available in federal court if the suspect was aware neither that her
statements could be used against her nor that she could seek the assistance
of counsel at any time (as well as when any statement is compelled or
involuntary under the totality of the circumstances test). Although
confessions might be admitted under this rule where suspects mistakenly
believe they have an obligation to respond to police questioning, this
236

Compare Clymer, supra note 63, at 479-85 (arguing Miranda rests on a finding of
inherent coercion in custodial interrogation but is still a case about admissibility of
evidence and the need to safeguard the trial right).
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See 384 U.S. at 467 (stating the goal of the warnings is “to combat” – not entirely dispel
– “these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege”); id. at 469-70
(acknowledging warnings cannot really dispel the coercion inherent in interrogation). This
substantive right, of course, encompasses an idea of notice, but it is also a right to a lesser
degree of the coercion presumed to be part of police interrogation. Compare Thomas,
supra note 232 (arguing Miranda should be understood today to create a procedural due
process right to notice).
238
See Caminker, supra note 130, at 14-18.
239
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 436; Caminker, supra note 130, at 20; Dorf & Friedman,
supra note 139, at 72.
240
Miranda, of course, says that any alternative “safeguards” for the privilege must be
“fully as effective” as those announced by the Court. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 490 (1966). Thus, I disagree, not with the Court’s effort to define its holding as an
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, see id. (“In any event . . . the issues presented are of
constitutional dimension”), but with its attempt to assert too rigid a distinction between
right and remedy at the periphery of the privilege.
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remedy – and the corresponding definition of the right that it entails – takes
account of the actual level of compulsion and focuses on the suspect’s
ability to reflect on whether to talk or remain silent. Whether or not this
hypothetical statute provides a good remedy for the routine coercion of
police interrogation, the outer limits of the right and remedy are questions
of constitutional policy best left to Congress. Although the question would
be close, this statute should survive judicial review if itre flects a reasonable
interpretation of Miranda and defines a right that is sufficiently close to
what the Court sought to accomplish.241
3. The Critical Role of Damages
For all my efforts to justify a broad constitutional privilege outside
the criminal courtroom and especially in the stationhouse, its status remains
uncertain. To see why, remember the central issue in Chavez: Martinez
asked the courts to hold that damages are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
as an additional remedy – and, sometimes, the only available remedy – for
violations of the privilege. Of course, damages will almost never be
available for violations of the privilege during courtroom proceedings,
because the judge, prosecutor, and police officers acting as witnesses would
have absolute immunity in any resulting civil rights action.242 But the
remedy of automatic use and derivative-use immunity that would flow from
these violations is probably sufficient (especially since the remedy would
likely also trigger a mistrial if the violation occurred at trial). In any event
241

For other hypothetical statutes, see Caminker, supra note 130, at 20-24; Dorf &
Friedman, supra note 139 (analyzing an extensive series of hypotheticals).
242
See Brisco v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (police officers acting as witness); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)
(prosecutors). Injunctive relief will almost never be available for violations of the privilege
in or out of court. Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against government officials must
demonstrate standing to seek prospective relief, which in turn requires a realistic claim that
they are reasonably likely to suffer future harm of the type they are complaining about. See
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983). In this context, a plaintiff
would have to claim that she is likely to be questioned by police about criminal activity in
the future (which comes close to an assertion that she is likely to be suspected of criminal
activity in the future), that the interrogation is likely to be coercive, and – depending on
one’s exact definition of the privilege – perhaps also that the authorities will somehow
succeed in introducing the resulting statements at trial. Cf. Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina,
199 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (suggesting Lyons rests in part on the
unlikelihood that plaintiff would engage in future misconduct requiring police
intervention). Of course, the inability to obtain injunctive relief also weakens the
underlying right, but because Lyons applies to all rights claims, that problem – while
significant and relevant – has no special salience here. See Parry, Judicial Restraints,
supra note 6, at 117-18 (discussing advantages of injunctive relief, including enhancement
of the meaning and value of rights).
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the disallowance of damages here flows from a general concern about
imposing liability on courtroom actors regardless of the constitutional right
violated and has nothing to do with the privilege in particular.
The world outside the courtroom is different. Subject to a variety of
restraints, damages generally are available for violations of constitutional
rights by non-courtroom state actors.243 If damages were available for
violation of the privilege outside the courtroom, then the scope and strength
of the privilege would be more firmly established – it would be like other
rights. Purely from a remedial perspective, moreover, the privilege literally
would be worth more to those whom it protects. So, too, its deterrent power
would increase significantly from that provided by immunity and exclusion
alone.244
If the privilege applies as a matter of constitutional right outside the
criminal trial, then limiting the remedies to immunity and exclusion of
testimony creates an unstable right, precisely because the lack of a damages
remedy suggests there may not really be a substantive right. The immunity
and exclusion remedies, after all, can be described as safeguards for a trial
right.245 Coming from the other direction, if these remedies are merely
safeguards for a trial right, then one can easily understand the argument
against imposing damages on state actors in federal civil rights actions for
violations of non-constitutional rules. At best, we are left in a tenuous
position. But if the right is to be as strong as its definition in caselaw often
indicates, then damages should be available.
Perhaps the Court already realizes this. Justice Thomas’s opinion,
in particular, suggests he understood thatthe scope of the remedies
provided for violation of the privilege helps to define the scope of the right.
Allowing damages for conduct outside the trial would be inconsistent with
the view that the privilege only protects a trial right. Moreover, he saw that
even the immunity remedy is in tension with that view, and thus he went out
of his way to declare immunity merely a prophylactic protection for the trial
right.246 For his part, Justice Souter’s approach to the appropriate remedy
matches his Harlan-derived vision of the privilege as a right that goes
beyond trial but that does so only weakly. He, too, understood that
allowing damages as a routine matter would make the right more powerful
than his sense of the appropriate policy balance would allow. Thus, when
243

See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (defining the qualified immunity
standard that largely determines when such claims may be heard on the merits).
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See Levinson, supra note 143, at 904 (“a right with less remedy is worth less and a right
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See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2003-04 (plurality opinion).
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he declared his reluctance to “expand the protection of the privilege against
self-incrimination to the point of civil liability,”247 he explicitly linked the
scope of the privilege to the package of available remedies. Finally, Justice
Kennedy insisted that damages should be available (although not for
Miranda violations) precisely because the right is a substantive protection
that sweeps more broadly than the criminal trial.248
Without damages, the set of remedies for violations of the privilege
is probably inadequate. Consider particularly situations in which law
enforcement officials conclude it is worth compelling a statement from one
person in order to have evidence that will lead to more significant suspects.
In that situation, immunity and exclusion will provide inadequate
deterrence, with the result that the right will be violated more often than if
damages were available. And, as Steven Clymer has shown, in the context
of Miranda the incentives to violate the privilege overwhelm the incentives
to comply with it.249
That said, perhaps we should broaden the focus. As Justice Harlan
emphasized, decisions about the constitutional constraints on custodial
interrogation – and the remedies for unconstitutional interrogations – are
issues of constitutional, not just Fifth Amendment , policy.250 If we get
adequate protection against compelled incrimination outside the Fifth
Amendment privilege, then we have less at stake in whether the privilege is
a trial right or, if it is, whether damages are available for its violation. If, on
the other hand, there is a gap in protection, we must decide how much of a
gap, if any, we want to tolerate. Put bluntly, both the trial right
interpretation of the privilege and the interpretation I have advanced are
logical. If the Due Process Clauses do the same work as my interpretation
of the privilege, then the choice between the two interpretations becomes
less important. But if the Due Process Clauses are not coextensive with my
interpretation of the privilege, then accepting the trial right interpretation
also requires accepting a gap in protection against compelled testimony.
Chavez suggests that the Court will allow compelled testimony and
coercive interrogation (to the extent there is a difference between the two) at
the price, at most, of use and derivative-use immunity and exclusion of
evidence, so long as the coercion is not too shocking. In my view, the
protection that Chavez would provide is far too little. Either due process
247

Id. at 2007 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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See Clymer, supra note 63, at 502-25.
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See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 511 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing the
Court has already addressed issues of compelled incrimination under the due process
clause, so there is no need to expand the privilege against self-incrimination as well).
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will have to provide a great deal of protection in order to narrow the gap, or
we must embrace a conception of the privilege as a right that goes beyond
the trial and is enforceable by damages – or both. The next section
addresses the scope of the due process protection against coercive
interrogation. As we will see, without doctrinal change, the due process
right and remedy are almost certainly inadequate.
B. Due Process and Coercive Interrogation
The Due Process Clauses intersect with interrogation in two ways.
First, involuntary confessions are inadmissible as a matter of due process.
Second, some interrogation practices are so severe that they violate
substantive due process rights and will support a claim for damages even
under the position adopted by the Chavez plurality.251 The Chavez plurality
ducked the question of when conduct that produces a confession that is
involuntary and thus inadmissible can also support a damages claim. By
contrast, the lower courts in Chavez and Justice Ginsburg, and to some
extent Justices Stevens and Kennedy, seemed to take the position that there
is substantial overlap between inadmissible involuntary confessions and
substantive due process-violating interrogation practices.
1. Involuntary Confessions
A confession is involuntary in violation of due process if “’a
defendant’s will was overborne’ by the circumstances surrounding the
giving of a confession.”252 To make this determination, a court must
consider “’the totality of all the surrounding circumstances – both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’”253
Moreover, when describing the details of an interrogation, courts often
describe the interrogators’ actions as “coercive.”254 But the Court has also
insisted that “a finding of coercion need not depend upon actual violence by
a government agent; a credible threat is sufficient.”255 Other cases make
clear that “promises of leniency, threats of adverse consequences to others,
251

See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004-05 (conceding damages are available for interrogation
practices that violate substantive due process rights); see also Clymer, supra note 63
(arguing the privilege and Miranda are trial rights and due process standards control the
availability of damages); Loewy, supra note 63 (same).
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Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
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Id. (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226).
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See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991) (concluding defendant’s
“will was overborne in such a way as to render his confession the product of coercion”);
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (holding some form of “official coercion”
or “oppressive” or “overreaching” police conduct is a necessary part “of the inquiry into
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and certain types of deception would qualify as improper police practices,
which, at least in the context of a prolonged interrogation, might be
sufficient to render a resulting confession involuntary.”256 The test, in other
words, is whether the interrogation tactics made the confession involuntary,
and coercion is a short- hand description of the kind of atmosphere in which
a defendant would make an involuntary statement.257 While easily stated,
the test is famously difficult to apply in a consistent manner.258
Importantly, moreover, the Supreme Court appears to equate the
circumstances that make a confession involuntary with the level of pressure
necessary to make testimony compelled in violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination.259 One result of this equation is that few courts will find
a confession involuntary under due process if the suspect received the
Miranda warnings, waived them, and thus apparently spoke free of Fifth
Amendment compulsion.260
Not everyone agrees with the equation of compulsion and
involuntariness. Stephen Schulhofer, for example, maintains that the two
inquiries are obviously distinct. Compulsion, for Schulhofer, is pressure,
but due process requires the additional step of breaking a suspect’s will
256

WHITE, supra note 38, at 46.
See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 287 n.3 (“Our prior cases have used the terms ‘coerced
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shorthand.’) (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960)).
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Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (equating Fifth Amendment compulsion with
“coercion”); see also Alschuler, supra note 86, at 2626-27 n.6 (suggesting compulsion for
purposes of the privilege and coercion for purposes of due process are functionally the
same).
260
See WHITE, supra note 38, at 120-22.
257

Constitutional Interpretation and Coercive Interrogation

64

through coercion, thus making a confession not just compelled but also
involuntary.261 In the context of this article, Schulhofer’s approach appears
to contemplate three levels of constitutional concern about interrogation:
concern under the privilege for non-coercive compulsion that would
exclude more testimony than would current doctrine; concern under due
process for additional pressure – coercion – that breaks the will and makes a
confession involuntary; and concern under substantive due process for
coercion that shocks the conscience and supports an award of damages. I
sympathize with Schulhofer’s position – and depending on how the Court
would apply a damages remedy, some version of his approach could
become a reality262 – but the rest of my discussion will assume that
compulsion and involuntariness are the same under current doctrine.
Before Chavez, several lower courts allowed damages claims for
violations of the voluntariness test. By contrast, few courts had allowed
damages claims for violations of Miranda.263 Because the Court was
fractured in Chavez, the validity of the lower court cases remains up for
grabs. With no clear resolution of the issue by the Court, we can expect
continued § 1983 litigation over violations of the voluntariness test. Yet if
compulsion and involuntariness are the same thing, then the best
interpretation of Chavez is that damages are almost never available for
involuntary confessions unless the conduct that made the confession
involuntary is conscience-shocking. Remember that the four justice
plurality would have held that damages are never available for compelled
testimony in violation of the privilege, and Justices Souter and Breyer
declared that damages should rarely be available in such cases. In short, the
best we can say about the implications of Chavez is that it seems unlikely
the Court will embrace anytime soon the position that every involuntary
confession will supporta da mages claim. Far more clearly than the
privilege, in other words, the due process voluntary confession doctrine is a
trial right.
2. Interrogation and Substantive Due Process
With the involuntary confession doctrine operating as a trial right,
we immediately find a potential gap in protection against coercive
interrogation. The Chavez plurality’s approach to substantive due process
confirms the gap and demonstrates its breadth. The plurality considered
261
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two approaches to substantive due process: shocks the conscience, and
fundamental rights. The shocks the conscience test has an uneasy place in
substantive due process doctrine. Sacramento v. Lewis resurrected it from
apparent dormancy, but with significant ambiguity. Lewis seemed to
suggest the test applies to executive conduct while the familiar fundamental
rights-liberty interest dichotomy applies to legislative action.264 Yet, Lewis
also suggested that the fundamental rights analysis is a second step after a
finding that conduct shocks the conscience.265 In Chavez, however, Justice
Thomas treated the two inquiries as alternatives.266 No other justice clearly
disputed this point.267
Even before Lewis, however, critics on and off the Court charged
that the shocks the conscience test was simply too vague to be applied, and
the charge was renewed after Lewis, buoyed, perhaps, by Justice Scalia’s
Cole Porter-inspired riff against it.268 Chavez does little to help in this area.
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County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). Arguably, the shocks the
conscience standard was actually rehabilitated in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115 (1992), in which the Court declared that the City’s “alleged failure to train its
employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm, was an omission that can not
properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience-shocking, in a constitutional sense.”
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F. Tepker, Jr., The Arbitrary Path of Due Process, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 207-08 (2000).
265
Id. at 847 n.8.
266
See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005 (plurality opinion).
267
Justice Souter’s discussion of substantive due process quoted Lewis’s shocks the
conscience standard and so could be read as suggesting that the fundamental rights
standard should not also be available. See id. at 2008 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849). Justice Kennedy said little about the precise
due process framework he employed, but he cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) – the original shocks the conscience case – as support for his claim that “torture or
its equivalent . . . violates an individual’s fundamental right to liberty.” Id. at 2016
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
268
See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“today’s opinion
resuscitates the ne plus ultra, the Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane
of subjectivity, th’ ol’ ‘shocks-the-conscience’ test”). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
responded by describing the test as grounded in “traditions, precedents, and historical
understanding [as] the starting point, but not in all cases the ending point.” Id. at 857
(Kennedy, J., concurring). For other criticisms of Lewis and the shocks the conscience
test, see Robert Chesny, Old Wine or New? The Shocks-the-Conscience Standard and the
Distinction between Legislative and Executive Action, 50 SYR. L. REV. 981 (2000); Tepker,
supra note 264; Matthew D. Umhofer, Confusing Pursuits: Sacramento v. Lewis and the
Future of Substantive Due Process in the Executive Setting, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 437
(2001); The Supreme Court, 1997 Term – Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 192 (1998).
For a more sympathetic treatment of the test as simply a shorthand for asking whether
action is constitutionally arbitrary, see Rubin, supra note 44, at 845-47.
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Justices Breyer, O’Connor, and Souter said nothing about the range of
conduct that shocks the conscience. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and
Ginsburg urged a fairly expansive view. Justice Thomas, joined by Justices
Scalia and Rehnquist, urged a restrictive view.
Critically, Justice Thomas’s opinion seems clearly in line with Lewis
on two issues. First, the shocks the conscience test is a back stop, meant to
forbid “only the most egregious official conduct.”269 The Chavez plurality
and Lewis suggest that the egregious conduct requirement will usually
require that the official acted with the “intent to injure.”270 In other words,
the default culpability standard for shocks the conscience damages claims is
specific intent – acting with the purpose of causing the injury – rather than
reckless disregard or even knowledge that injury is likely to occur. If so,
then there almost certainly will be a large gap between the shocks the
conscience test and a trial right conception of the privilege. In the hands of
the Chavez plurality, then, shocks the conscience is not just a shorthand for
constitutionally arbitrary conduct – as some commentators had suggested –
because it plainly requires plaintiffs to show that official conduct is
“egregious,” not just that it is unconstitutional and arbitrary enough to
require exclusion of evidence.271
Second, Lewis mentioned and the Chavez plurality makes much of
the idea that conduct only shocks the conscience if it is “unjustifiable by
any government interest.”272 According to the plurality, the need to obtain
“key evidence” justifies relentless interrogation of a seriously wounded
man. In fact, the possibility that Martinez may have been dying simply
heightened the government’s need and, hence, the justification for the
interrogation.273 Nor was this simply Justice Thomas’s idea. The Solicitor
General made the same argument in an amicus brief.274 Unless the Court
places limits on the necessity idea, this argument justifies a range of
otherwise shocking government conduct, potentially including torture.
The simple fact that the government can raise a necessity claim to
justify coercive interrogation and perhaps even torture, while obviously
troubling, is not a fatal objection. Many – although not all – of the
commentators who have considered the issue agree that torture is justifiable
269

See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846.
See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005 (plurality opinion); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-54; see also
supra note 62 (noting the uncomfortable position in Chavez of Justice Souter, who wrote
the lead opinion in Lewis).
271
Compare Rubin, supra note 44, at 845-47.
272
See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.
273
See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2005.
274
See Brief for United States, supra note 58, at 21-23.
270
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in extremely rare cases.275 Nonetheless, the Court’s use of the necessity
rationale in an interro gation context is distressing. The Court articulated a
very relaxed standard – is there “any government interest”? If the
government can supply a need, then the conduct apparently will not shock
the conscience. In future cases, the Courtshould toughen the standard
significantly across the board or at least require greater justification for
conduct that is more shocking than Chavez’s interrogation of Martinez. In
difficult cases, the need for information already exerts enormous pressure in
favor of harsh methods, with the inevitable result that a vague or lenient
standard is bound to fail.276
275

For an argument to that effect and a collection of other authorities, see Parry & White,
supra note 54, at 760-65. Put differently, despite the obvious and strong constitutional
prohibition on torture, see id. at 751-53; Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the
Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
278 (2003), the individual constitutional right to be free of torture is not absolute.
(International law takes a different view. See infra note 276.) The most common protorture hypothetical is the “ticking time bomb” scenario, in which law enforcement
officials know a bomb will explode imminently in a crowded location, and they have in
custody a person whom they are certain knows where the bomb is – yet that person will not
talk. See Parry & White, supra note 54, at 760-61.
276
For example, in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, the Supreme
Court of Israel ruled that torture was illegal but the necessity defense would be available
for officials prosecuted for the use of torture. After discussing the ticking time bomb
scenario, the court suggested that the imminence requirement of the necessity defense
might be met even if the hypothetical bomb “is set to explode in a few days, or perhaps
even after a few weeks.” H.C. 5100/94, 53(4) P.D. 817 (1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M.
1471, 1486 (1999). In other words, the magnitude of the potential harm controlled and
warped the imminence requirement. See Parry & White, supra note 54, at 764 n.95. The
Chavez plurality’s necessity rationale is also troubling because of the conflict it creates
with our obligations under international law. The Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment flatly forbids torture as well as
“other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount
to torture.” Pt. 1, art. 1, & 1, & art. 16, & 1 (1984), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/ a39r046.htm. The Convention does not define
“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” and in the course of giving its
consent to the Convention, the U.S. Senate attempted to craft a more precise definition:
“the United States considers itself bound by the obligation . . . to prevent ‘cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment,’ only insofar as the term . . . means the cruel,
unusual and inhuman treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.” Resolution of Advice
and Consent to Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Reservations, Declarations, and
Understandings I(1), 136 Cong. Rec. S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). In other words, the
Senate declared that the Convention only bans conduct that is already unconstitutional and
gave federal courts the ultimate power to define the United States’ understanding of its
international obligations. At the same time, however, the Convention also declares that no
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Still, the shocks the conscience test is not the sum of substantive due
process. The Chavez plurality made clear that the more familiar
fundamental rights test also applies to substantive due process claims
challenging official conduct. If the Court recognizes an interest as a
fundamental right, the government may trample that right only if it can pass
the strict scrutiny test: its action must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.277 In Bowers v. Hardwick278 and Washington v.
Glucksberg,279 the Court set out a method for determining whether an
interest rises to the level of a fundamental right. The Court requires a
“careful description” of the claimed right and asks whether that right is
“deeply rooted” in history and tradition.280
The point of the careful description requirement was to prevent
analysis at too high a level of generality that would open the door to judicial
activism.281 Yet the plurality opinion in Chavez throws that requirement
aside after paying lip service to it. Rather than focusing on Martinez’s
specific circumstances and tailoring the analysis to them, Justice Thomas
insisted that Martinez sought a broad “freedom from unwanted police
questioning,” and he easily rejected the argument.282 Freedom from
unwanted questioning while severely wounded or near death would have
been a more careful description of the claimed right, and Justice Thomas
might then have had to determine whether the state had a compelling
interest under the circumstances.283

justification is possible for acts of state torture. See Convention, supra, pt. 1, art. 2, ¶ 2.
Thus, unless the Court changes course, the Chavez plurality’s statement that an action does
not shock the conscience if there is “any government interest” creates a contradiction
within our obligations under the Convention.
277
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
301-02 (1993).
278
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472 (2003).
279
521 U.S. 702.
280
Id. at 721; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91; see Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2006 (plurality
opinion) (adopting this position).
281
See id.; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191, 194 -95; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 12728 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.). For criticism of the idea that the Court should proceed from the
most specific level of generality, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING
THE CONSTITUTION (1991); Jack M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613 (1994).
282
Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2006 (plurality opinion).
283
As Mark Kelman noted in a different context, the use of a broad or narrow frame to
guide analysis is a choice that varies from case to case depending on a party’s situation – so
the inconsistent application of the “careful description” test should come as no surprise.
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Chavez, together with Lawrence v. Texas284 and the earlier case of
Troxel v. Granville,285 makes clear that the Bowers/ Glucksberg
methodology is malleable and that its application will be inconsistent and
uncertain, depending in part upon how much room the Court is willing to
make in individual cases for generalizations and historical change.286
Sometimes that malleability will aid those asserting a right, as in Lawrence
and Troxel, while at other times it will impede their efforts, as in Bowers
and Glucksberg. Whether it ultimately will aid or impede Martinez in his
suit against Chavez is a matter for remand, at least for now.287
Even if the fundamental rights approach is open to manipulation, it
has one virtue. Rather than simply articulate “any . . . interest,” the
government must demonstrate a “compelling interest” and show that the
means it has employed to achieve that interest are narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.288 In the context of interrogation, for example, this standard
suggests that the government could use torture in a ticking time bomb
scenario, but only as something close to a last resort.289
See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591 (1981).
284
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
285
530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (stating parents have a.fundamental right to make
decisions about the care, custody, and control of their children). The Court was as badly
fractured in Troxel as it was in Chavez.
286
For example, in Lawrence, the Court criticized Bowersfor “fail[ing] to appreciate the
extent of the liberty at stake,” which went beyond the right to engage in particular sexual
conduct to encompass “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most
private of places, the home.” 123 S. Ct. at 2478. The Court also faulted Bowers for failing
to recognize that “’history and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending
point of the substantive due process inquiry.’” Id. at 2480 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
287
Remember that, despite the plurality’s reasoning, a bare majority of the Court agreed
that Martinez’s substantive due process claim remained available, although there was no
clear majority rationale. See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2008; supra note 59. On remand, the
Ninth Circuit held that Martinez had a clearly established right to be free of coercive police
interrogation and sent the case back to the district court for further proceedings. See
Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003), rhg. en banc denied, 354
F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004).
288
Compare Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (stating action justified “by any government interest”
does not shock the conscience), with Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)
(stating strict scrutiny requires proof of a compelling interest), and Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (same).
289
Cf. Parry, What is Torture, supra note 1, at 260 (arguing the principle of escalation
requires that torture be the last in a series of progressively more coercive practices). The
fundamental rights approach still raises problems under international law because it still
allows justification of torture. See supra note 276. But the fundamental rights approach, at
least, puts a real straightjacket on government action.
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But pressure may still arise to put a thumb in the government’s side
of the scale. Presumably, the test is not “strict in theory but fatal in fact” in
the due process context any more than – after Grutter v. Bollinger290– it is
in the equal protection context.291 If so, then we need to remember
Korematsu, which teaches that that the test is easier to meet in times of war
or crisis.292 After September 11, we have been told repeatedly that we are
in a war on terrorism that requires real sacrifices of liberty to ensure
security, and we have deployed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, in part to
combat terror. Disturbing reports suggest that some of our forces have
come close to or even crossed the line of illegally coercive interrogation.293
Because of the context of fighting terrorism, moreover, these reports often
seem to come with a built-in claim of justification.
Substantive due process constraints on coercive interrogation, in
sum, do not provide as much protection as one might first expect. In
situations in which they perceive a need for information, officials will be
tempted to cross the line between constitutional and unconstitutional
conduct. Although these actions might lead to exclusion of evidence and
use immunity, Chavez – not to mention generally accepted substantive due
process doctrine – suggests that damages will be hard to come by.
C. Managing the Gap
A gap clearly exists between the amount of protection a substantive
rights conception of the privilege, enforceable by damages, could provide
(or that a due process voluntariness test backed up by damages could
provide), and the protections actually provided by the privilege and due
process under the Chavez plurality’s conception of current doctrine. We
must face, in other words, a series of choices about how strong the
constitutional constraints on interrogation need to be.
One possible response is to affirm the status quo as it appears to
exist after Chavez. Evidence can be excluded and immunity granted for
violations of the privilege or the due process voluntariness test, but damages
are not available unless the unconstitutional conduct rises to a particularly
egregious level. Under this regime, the right to be free of coercive
interrogation is mild in most cases and is a strong but not absolute
constraint only as official conduct gets close to torture. Justifications for
this position might include skepticism about the amount of harm actually
290

123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
But note that Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest some practices are never permissible.
See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2017 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
292
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
293
See Parry,What is Torture , supra note 1, at 237-38, 249-51.
291
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inflicted by conduct that falls short of the substantive due process
standard.294 Some harms, after all, are inevitable when governments act,
but – as the Court time and again insists – not all of them are of
constitutional dimension.
In the context of determining how criminal procedure and civil
rights litigation overlap, we could add a level to this argument to say that
even when harm rises to a constitutional level, it is not necessarily a
constitutional tort. The remedy could be something other than damages, so
that the strength of the constitutional right would be relatively weaker
where harm is at the low end of the constitutional scale. The Court in Lewis
seems to have adopted some version of this view, and the Chavez plurality
simply relied on that understanding.295 Although this argument has force,
we need to place it in the context of unconstitutionally coercive
interrogation techniques that will be practiced against people – like
Martinez – who are never charged with a crime, including suspects who are
in fact innocent. People in this situation do not have access to even the lowlevel remedies of exclusion and immunity. From the remedial perspective,
they have few if any constitutional rights during custodial interrogation.
For them, “it is damages or nothing.”296 Whether we should tolerate this
conception of the right and the amount of harm it allows is ultimately a
value judgment – one which I believe should be resolved in favor of
allowing a damages cause of action.
One could also argue in favor of the post-Chavez status quo by
emphasizing the need to free law enforcement officials from microscopic
review of their actions because greater legal regulation – and particularly
damages liability – would cause, and perhaps already causes, over-deterrence. While common in the context of civil rights litigation, this argument
is inadequate at such a broad level. If damages were available for violations
of the privilege or the due process voluntariness test, we would see more
litigation, which would increase costs to officers and local governments.
But that is exactly the point of allowing damages. We live now in a
294

In this sense, the Court’s treatment of interrogation claims could be compared to the
traditional reluctance of common law judges to recognize emotional distress claims. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 & cmts. (1965); Martha Chamallas, The
Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 491-503
(1998).
295
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1998) (highlighting the
concern expressed in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976), about turning the
Constitution into a “font of tort law).
296
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
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situation of under-deterrence, and any effort to move toward the optimum
level of deterrence requires increased incentives, which damages will
provide. Moreover, the general claim that constitutional tort litigation leads
too quickly to over-deterrence is largely speculative, and there is reason to
fear that under-deterrence is the more likely risk even when damages are
available.297 Further, amidst the concern about deterrence we should not
lose sight of the fact that damages also serve the critical goal of
compensating people for harms inflicted by governments and their
agents.298
I do not mean to dismiss the over-deterrence argument out of hand.
The question whether testimony has been compelled in violation of the
privilege or coerced in violation of due process turns on the totality of the
circumstances.299 Tests of this kind can easily be applied inconsistently,
which would make the deterrent effects of civil rights claims uncertain as
compared to the status quo of no claims at all except under substantive due
process. While the shocks the conscience and fundamental rights tests risk
being under-inclusive, the totality of the circumstances standard risks being
over-inclusive. This may be particularly true if claims can be brought by
any suspect who feels she was subjected to compulsion or coercion whether
or not she actually provided incriminating information.
Against this concern rests the fact that civil rights litigation requires
plaintiffs to navigate a variety of hurdles that screen out large numbers of
claims, including many that would be valid on the merits.300 Plaintiffs
whose confessions were admitted at their criminal trial and who were
convicted of a crime will have a particularly difficult time bringing
successful claims.301 Plaintiffs who made incriminating statements but
were never charged are likely not to bring claims unless the official conduct
was fairly severe (as in Chavez), at least in part because damages awards are
297

See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 370 (2000); see also Parry, Judicial
Restraints, supra note 6, at 113-15 (summarizing this issue).
298
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) (“the basic purpose of a § 1983 damages
award should be to compensate”).
299
See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
300
See Parry, Judicial Restraints, supra note 6, at 111-13 (explaining that, because of the
many obstacles to successful § 1983 litigation, damages rarely manage to provide full
compensation on an individual or aggregate level).
301
See Klein, Deconstitutionalized, supra note 55, at 445-48 (noting collateral estoppel
may prevent plaintiffs from relitigating admissibility of purportedly compelled testimony,
citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), and damages for a conviction and wrongful
imprisonment will be unavailable unless the plaintiff can first overturn her conviction,
citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).
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likely to be small if the jury learns of the statements (assuming juries are
unlikely to reward someone they see as a wrongdoer except in very
compelling cases). As a result, the plaintiffs most likely to have viable
claims are precisely those who were mistreated, made no incriminating
statements, and were released. Damages in many of these cases are likely
to be small as well, with the result that not all plaintiffs will come forward.
Recognizing a broader cause of action, in short, is unlikely to open the flood
gates of litigation unless the level of compulsion routinely employed by law
enforcement officials is more severe than most of us likely would expect.
Because the concern about over-deterrence is real but not overriding,
the easiest way to address it is simply not to allow damages for all
violations of the privilege or due process. Justice Kennedy, for example,
would require more than a violation of Miranda before making damages
available, while Justice Souter would allow damages for violations of the
privilege (including Miranda) only in compelling cases.302 These more
nuanced positions remind us that we can exclude claims in which the
compulsion was relatively minor or merely presumed – that is, claims in
which the right is weaker and the appropriate remedy is exclusion or
immunity. We should not embrace Justice Kennedy’s or Justice Souter’s
specific positions too quickly, however. Preventing damages for all
violations of Miranda while also maintaining all of the exceptions that
allow admission of compelled testimony at trial would, in Susan Klein’s
words, “render Miranda ineffectual.”303 Justice Souter’s desire to limit
damages to truly extraordinary cases would have an even more severe
impact on the privilege as a whole. The damages remedy must be more
expansive even if it does not apply in all cases.
The over-deterrence argument has a final piecein an era in which
law enforcement must guard against terrorism as well as ordinary crime. In
a situation of over-deterrence, law enforcement officials will play it safe,
which translates into less effective policing and a re sulting increase in at
least certain kinds of crimes. Increased crime, of course, means more harm
and less social welfare (assuming we exclude or discount the benefits to
criminals). Even if one is willing to accept increased crime as the price for
increased liability, the calculus should change – so the argument goes –
when the resulting harm increases exponentially. Terrorism provides this
exponential increase in harm, and so those who formerly were skeptical
302

See Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2007 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2013
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
303
Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1355. Chavez, of course, appears to do exactly this, but
cases pending before the Court create the opportunity to undo some of the damage. See
supra note 8.

Constitutional Interpretation and Coercive Interrogation

74

about over-deterrence need to rethink their position.
This argument also has force, but the substantive due process
framework already provides that otherwise improper police conduct may be
justified by exigent circumstances, and this exception could continue to be a
part of any new model we adopt. More generally, despite the real concern
about terrorism, the fact remains that the bulk of law enforcement resources,
particularly at the state and local levels, are devoted to preventing and
solving more common crimes. If we need special rules for terrorism, then
we should apply themin that context rather than across the board. E xtreme
cases should not control everyday doctrine.304
Taking all of these concerns into account, the best way to manage
the gap is to allow damages where the plaintiff can prove (1) an intentional
violation of Miranda,305 (2) conduct that actually compels testimony in violation of the privilege or renders a confession involuntary in violation of
due process, or (3) conduct that under the circumstances amounts to
compulsion or coercion as an objective matter whether or not a confession
or other incriminating statement results.306 This position weeds out minor
cases where there was no actual compulsion and little fault can be ascribed
to the interrogator, but it also increases deterrence, advances the goal of
compensation, and confirms the privilege (including Miranda) and due
process as rights that constrain conduct outside the courtroom.307
304

Cf. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 312 (3rd ed.
1999) (“The danger of such extreme examples is that, by focusing our attention on the rare
and exceptional, they may train us to see moral choice only when it is presented in stark
terms . . . . The hard ethical questions in life arise not only in those rare instances that
mirror the moralist’s stark hypotheticals, but also in the vaguer, infinitely more complex
arena of ordinary life.”).
305
See Klein, Silence, supra note 55, at 1354-55 (making this argument).
306
In the second and third categories, the general rule of Colorado v. Connelly – that police
conduct and not the suspect’s mental condition is the touchstone – would remain in place.
See 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986); cf. Klein, Deconstitutionalized, supra note 55, at 471-73
(raising concerns about damages for all involuntary confessions because liability might
turn on “the particular susceptibility of the suspect” rather than on the amount of coercion).
More generally, the focus on intent and actual conduct during interrogation should allow
my proposal to skirt the Court’s reluctance to allow damages for negligent deprivations of
due process rights. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1998);
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
307
When I suggest this is the best result, I mean that the Supreme Court should back away
from its holdings and suggestions in Chavez and adopt this position instead. Critically,
however, and in line with my discussion of its proper role on constitutional interpretation,
Congress could prohibit damages in such cases by statute. (What Congress cannot do is
modify the remedies so much that the privilege is reduced to being only a trial right.) Note,
as well, that if damages were available for violations of the voluntariness test, then it could
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An obvious objection to this proposal is that it allows overlapping
causes of action in contradiction to the doctrine of Graham v. Connor.308
But with five justices willing to ignore that doctrine in Chavez, the
objection has little force. To the extent it does, the Court should abandon
Graham.309 One could also object that including intentional violations of
Miranda, which allows damages in some cases even without actual
compulsion, makes Miranda stronger than it ought to be. If Miranda were
already a strong doctrine, this objection would have force. But Miranda is
riddled by numerous exceptions, and allowing damages for intentional
violations is a rough way to even the playing field. If the Court were to rein
in the exceptions and make Miranda a more powerful rule of exclusion,310
then allowing the additional remedy of damages might make the right too
powerful, which in turn would justify capping the remedies short of
damages.
A more significant objection is that allowing damages for all
compelled or involuntary confessions would ultimately lead the Court to
raise the standard for excluding testimony. The unintended consequence of
my proposal, in other words, would not only be fewer damages claims than
I anticipate, but also fewer excluded confessions. Criminal suspects could
end up worse off. This strikes me as a significant concern. Yet if, as I have
suggested, the number of claims under my proposal is not overly high, a
careful Court that looked beyond the breathless claims made in briefs and
actually considered what was happening in the district courts would feel
little incentive to modify the totality of the circumstances test.311
Finally, one could advance a textual objection to allowing claims for
violations of the privilege even when no incriminating testimony has been
compelled. The Fifth Amendment bars compelling a person “to be a
witness against himself,”312 and one could reasonably argue these words
require not just compulsion but compulsion of a statement. As a result, my
be described as a substantive due process right. Thus, one way to describe my proposal on
the due process side is as a large expansion of a substantive due process right to be free of
coercive interrogation and abandonment of the shocks the conscience standard
308
490 U.S. 386 (1989).
309
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
310
See supra note 122, 233.
311
For example, charges of too many civil rights cases are probably overstated, and in any
event success rates in civil rights claims are lower than in other categories of cases, which
should give some pause to reflexive claims of over-deterrence. See THEODORE EISENBERG,
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 172-82 (5th ed. 2004) (summarizing
several studies); Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review, 5 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 492-96 (1997).
312
U.S. CONST., amend V.
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proposal would have to be rewritten to allow damages for violations of the
privilege when incriminating testimony was compelled, and damages for
violations of due process whether or not a confession resulted.313
I am relatively agnostic about this modification. On the one hand, I
am not convinced the text requires this limitation. On the other hand, admitting the objection and making the modification might also address the
objection that my proposal would harm suspects by raising the bar for excluding confessions. If damages were available only when a statement was
actually compelled in violation of the privilege, the class of potential plaintiffs for that cause of action would decrease and the Court would feel less
pressure to tinker with the test for compulsion. At the same time, however,
if damages remain available for violations of the due process voluntariness
standard, then the Court might raise the bar on the due process side. The
result could be a distinction between compulsion under the privilege and
involuntariness under due process.314 Again, such a result probably would
be unnecessary because the increase in litigation would not be nearly as
great as over-deterrence agitators tend to assume. Yet so long as the
standard for excluding incriminating statements under the privilege remains
the same, then raising the bar on the due process side – so long as it stops
well short of current substantive due process standards – may be a price
worth paying.
CONCLUSION
The fractured decision in Chavez displays the tensions in selfincrimination and due process jurisprudence. One group of justices seeks to
rein in the privilege by transforming large parts of current doctrine into
prophylactic rules that may be subject to congressional override. While
admitting a damages remedy for violations of substantive due process, they
would define the cause of action so narrowly and create such significant
exceptions that few will ever be able to take advantage of it. On the other
end of the Court, Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg – and probably Justice
Stevens as well – seek to create a broad remedy against coercive
interrogation practices. The justices in the middle hold the balance of
power, yet they seem unable to articulate a complete approach.
Especially in the self-incrimination context, the Court’s tensions are
313

This revision would also help satisfy proponents of Graham v. Connor.
As I noted earlier, Stephen Schulhofer has long advocated a distinction between
compulsion under the privilege and involuntariness under due process. See supra notes
261-62 and accompanying text. I doubt, however, that he would embrace the distinction I
develop in the text. His view is that the current standard for compulsion is too high and
should be lowered relative to due process, and so he would presumably prefer a single
totality of the circumstances test for both provisions to a harder due process test.
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magnified by its unwillingness to recognize remedies as integral parts of
constitutional rights and a corresponding inability to use remedies to shape
doctrine. The justices in the middle come closest to appreciating the
importance of remedies, but rather than spark doctrinal change, that
realization risks producing uncertainty. Concerns about terrorism, unstated
in the opinions but on display in the briefs, feed the uncertainty of the
middle and strengthen the hand of the justices who would narrow the
privilege and limit the scope of substantive due process.
For all of this, Chavez could mark a turning point in constitutional
jurisprudence. Faced with doctrinal tension that results in part from
ignoring the proper place of remedies and wallowing in the swamp of
prophylactic rules, the Court should choose a different course. The idea of
prophylactic rules should be abandoned. Because the Constitution is
imprecise, all constitutional doctrine fails to match with one or the other
ideal interpretation of the document, but the doctrine is nonetheless
constitutional law in every sense of the term. Critically, however, the
Court’s understanding of the Constitution must make more room for
Congress. With its admitted power over the precise scope of remedies,
Congress necessarily plays a role in creating constitutional meaning.
In the context of coercive interrogation, these insights should lead
the Court to recognize that the immunity remedy makes the privilege more
than a trial right even as Congress may be able to modify the periphery of
the doctrine, including Miranda. Similarly, by taking a remedial approach,
we also learn that rights enforceable through damages actions are worth
more than right enforceable through more limited remedies. Most
unconstitutionally coercive interrogation – whether under the privilege or
under due process – falls in the latter category. As a result, the right to be
free of coercion is weak. Only damages can make it strong.

